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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial opinions receive a lot of attention from American legal scholars.
Nearly all the commentary, however, takes for granted that an opinion should
be a discursive narrative, consisting of a candid and reasoned explanation of
the court's holding. To American lawyers, judges, and mainstream scholars,
the judicial opinion is a valuable legal institution in its own right. American
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jurists think that, independent of the result in the case, the opinion should be
evaluated on its own terms, for it is more than a vehicle for expressing a
ruling on the discrete dispute before the court. An opinion is an instrument for
achieving systemic goals: providing guidance to lawyers and lower courts,
persuading readers of the rightness of the decision, constraining arbitrary
action on the part of judges, and legitimating their efforts. Americans think
that a judge's failure to pursue or achieve these goals is ground for serious
criticism of the judge's work, whatever the substantive merit of the court's
rulings.
In this Article, I examine the foundations of American judicial form, in
particular the proposition that powerful instrumental considerations support the
issuance of reasoned opinions. This project proceeds from the belief that the
form of judicial opinions deserves serious scholarly attention despite the broad
consensus about its value, because it frames the terms of debate on every
issue courts confront.' My analysis is built on the view that critical insights
into the nature of one's own legal system can be gleaned only by "under-
stand[ing] what [one's] system is not," a task that requires putting aside the
internal perspective of a participant and adopting instead the detached pose of
a student of legal systems. 2
Accordingly, my methodology compares the mode of decisionmaking
employed by American judges to the radically different approach taken by
judges in France. This comparative analysis is designed to introduce the
distinctively terse and syllogistic opinion form used in France, to illuminate
commonly shared assumptions about our own system, and to call into question
some normative propositions about judicial opinions that Americans take for
granted. I argue that French judicial form provides a powerful counterexample
to the American view that opinions should contain reasoned and candid
explanations in the pursuit of instrumental ends. My analysis suggests that
appraisal of judicial opinions should focus more on the formal and substantive
merits of the legal doctrine that they expound, and less on the sufficiency and
quality of the reasoning they contain.
The arguments offered here hardly compel the conclusion that the
traditional understanding of American judicial opinions is unfounded.
Comparisons with another legal culture can rarely prove anything about the
nature of one's own institutions, for differences will often be explicable on
several grounds.' My more modest aim is to sow doubt in the minds of
1. See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTh AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIvE LAW 9 (1990)
("Often the thing that 'goes without saying,' that remains unspoken, never questioned, has a greater impact
than what we call law.").
2. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SuBsTANcE iN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 418
(1987).
3. See GROSSFELD, supra note 1, at 72 ("The dilemma is this: the more we try to catch the foreign
law in all its individuality, as we must, the more we appreciate its cultural and societal context, the less
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readers who might, absent their encounter with the French opinion, take the
standard account of judicial opinions for granted. For example, the skepticism
of legal reasoning reflected in legal realist and Critical Legal Studies
scholarship, as well as in law-and-economics scholarship,4 may seem more
plausible to a reader who, upon learning that France gets along with
"dysfunctional" opinions, for the first time takes a hard look at the necessity
of reasoned decisionmaking and the extent to which American opinions
actually serve the functions our legal culture ascribes to them.
Before making these arguments, it will be helpful to set forth in general
terms how I believe comparisons with French practice can inform those
arguments. Anyone who works within a culture necessarily adopts the widely
held conventions of other participants in order to take part effectively in its
activities. Accordingly, American lawyers, judges, and mainstream scholars
prepare briefs, opinions, and doctrinal scholarship as though the reasoned
American opinion is an indispensable institution. Yet, playing by the rules of
the game differs from thinking that these rules are the only ones possible. By
failing to examine one's own culture with critical distance from the culture's
assumptions, one risks making grave error.' As we will see, Americans may
cling to the reasoned opinion, because, living in a society where politically
unaccountable judges play a prominent role in lawmaking, they need to
believe that adjudication is something more than the naked exercise of
power.6 We may, accordingly, flee from even asking uncomfortable
questions, such as whether reason is really as important as judges purport it
to be and whether very many opinions actually meet their ideals.
Alternatively, we may merely be creatures of habit. Our customary
perspective on fundamental legal institutions like judicial form is from the
inside. We rarely think much about them, but take them for granted as
structures within which the daily routine of judging, lawyering, and teaching
unfolds.7 Comparisons with other legal cultures enable us to step outside our
system and glean insights into features of the legal landscape that are
possible it seems to compare it with others.").
4. See infra text accompanying notes 276 to 280.
5. See, e.g., ALFRED L. KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY: CULTURE PATrERNS & PROCESSES 60-64, 88-
94 (Harcourt 1963) (1923) (describing how cultural beliefs are so deeply ingrained that they often preclude
rational consideration of alternative courses of action that do not figure in that culture's basic set of
assumptions).
6. Cf. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123-44 (1983) (arguing that,
because of American practice of judicial review of legislation, Americans worry more than others about
judicial self-aggrandizement and search for jurisprudential theories that identify appropriate judicial
activism and illegitimatejudicial activism); EDwARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
172-73, 202-03 (1973); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 282-83, 285-86 (1973) [hereinafter White, Evolution]
(arguing that, faced with example of totalitarianism in Europe, American lawyers came to stress process
values as they sought to show that American law was not merely naked exercise of power).
7. See PETER L. BEROER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 65-66,
88-89 (1966) (discussing tendency to take social institutions for granted and to forget that they are actually
made and maintained by human beings).
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otherwise obscured by our familiarity with them. Confronted with something
different, we may find that aspects of our world that we thought we
understood now need to be reconsidered. Learning about the French opinion
helps us to perceive that common understandings of the American opinion
may be more problematic than we ordinarily suppose.
Part II of this Article discusses a group of widely held beliefs regarding
American judicial form. It identifies reason and candor as the central features
of the ideal American opinion and describes how those features serve the
desirable ends of providing guidance, persuading other participants in the legal
process, constraining judges from abusing their power, and legitimating
judicial creativity.
Part m sketches the features of the standard French opinion. Especially
in the highest courts, the French opinion is an uninformative syllogism of a
few hundred words that purports to deduce the holding from a code or
statutory provision. French opinions are neither reasoned nor candid and make
no serious effort to realize the goals Americans consider important. Part III
also suggests that the form of French opinions resulted from two historical
influences. First, in the period before the French Revolution, French courts
felt no compulsion to give reasons for their judgments, since their power
derived from absolute monarchs who themselves had no obligation to justify
their actions. Second, a tenet of the Revolution was that the legislature was
the only legitimate lawmaker; as a result, courts after the Revolution strove
to appear not to be making law, even when they were.
Parts IV and V reexamine the premises behind the American opinion in
light of French practice. Part IV argues that the very survival over time of
French form should lead us to question whether reason and candor are as
important in judicial opinions as we may think. The supposed benefits of
American form - in particular persuasion and legitimacy - may be largely
illusory. In any event, it is difficult to identify functional differences between
the two legal systems that would justify French form for France and American
form for America. Either the French system is inferior for failing to pursue
persuasion and legitimacy, or Americans overstate the importance of those
goals.
Part V challenges the American conception of the judicial opinion as an
instrument for achieving guidance, persuasion, legitimacy, and constraint.
That conception may be based less on its merits than on our familiarity with
it, our lack of knowledge of alternatives, and a tendency to confuse the very
best judicial writing with the horde of ordinary opinions. Once we remove
these blinders, we may conclude that American opinion form is as much an
artifact of our history and culture as its French counterpart.
[Vol. 19: 81
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If. FoRM AND FUNCTION IN THE AMERICAN OPINION
When American lawyers evaluate judicial opinions, they ordinarily
distinguish between two very different kinds of inquiries. On the one hand,
they may focus on the substantive outcome of a case, asking whether the court
announced a good rule, or correctly applied the rule to the facts, or simply
reached the result that best serves justice, liberty, or social utility. Most
American lawyers, however, evaluate opinions by another criterion as well.
Quite separate from the merits, they maintain that the opinion handed down
by the court deserves scrutiny, for it is more than a device for communicating
the outcome of a case. In their view, a good opinion is a candid and rigorous
exercise in legal reasoning.' The reasoned opinion is itself a judicial
institution serving important social values, and we can evaluate it in terms of
how well it realizes those values.
The consensus on this proposition is evident from the most common
features of our practice. When lawyers and judges say that they agree with the
outcome reached by the majority, but prefer the opinion written by a
dissenting judge, they affirm awareness of this distinction between the merits
and the opinion.9 Similarly, efforts by concurring judges to compose a more
persuasive document in support of a conclusion already agreed to, and
criticism directed by lawyers and law professors at the reasoning rather than
the outcome of a case 0 start from the premise that the opinion has value
independent of the result. Lawyers learn this distinction early in their careers.
Much of the discussion in law school classrooms is aimed not at the merits
and demerits of the rules announced by courts, but at identifying strengths and
weaknesses in the reasoning judges set forth to support those outcomes.
In elaborating these views throughout Part II, I do not intend to endorse
them. On the contrary, I argue that the validity of this account of judicial
opinions is open to question. I discuss them at length in order to set up a
target for attack later in the discussion.
8. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 1 (1990) ("mhe quality of judging depends on
commitment to method. Judicial choice, at its best, is reasoned choice, candidly explained."); David L.
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (arguing that "reasoned
response to reasoned argument is an essential aspect of [the judicial] process," and "candor is the sine qua
non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power").
Throughout this Article the term "legal reasoning" is used as a shorthand for the traditional
techniques ofjudicial justification, such as relying upon or distinguishing prior cases, interpreting statutes,
pursuing the general good, invoking widely held ethical principles, and striving to avoid arbitrary
distinctions and achieve doctrinal coherence.
9. See, e.g., JAMES B. WIrTE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 175 (1990) [hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE
As TRANSLATION].
10. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 190 (1985).
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A. Aims of the Reasoned Opinion
Scholarly commentary on the American opinion attempts to explain why
it is important to write a reasoned justification of the outcome, and why the
opinion should display candor by the court. What one finds in the literature
on opinion writing is not a debate over competing models of the judicial
opinion, but the presentation of an array of functions that opinions should
serve. They include (1) providing guidance to participants in the legal process,
(2) persuading their audience of judges, other officials, and citizens that the
court has arrived at the proper answer, (3) constraining judicial arbitrariness,
and (4) legitimating appropriate exercises in judicial creativity." It is not
enough that reasons be given afterwards, in law review articles and treatises.
Judges must supply them. By their terms, the last two aims can only be served
if the judges themselves give reasons. Moreover, judges alone provide
authoritative guidance, and judges typically will be the most persuasive
champions of their own views. Each of these functions requires some
elaboration.
1. Guidance
Opinions are forward-looking documents, composed to guide lawyers who
must advise clients and judges who must adjudicate disputes. As Karl
Llewellyn put it, "[T]he opinion has as one if not its major office to show
how like cases are properly to be decided in the future. "12 A naked statement
of the law, unaccompanied by reasons, provides little useful information to
this group of readers, for it gives no indication of what the deciding court will
consider to be a "like case." It could signify anything from a narrow decision
based on the particular facts of the case at hand to a fundamental change in
direction in the area of law under consideration. Lawyers and judges need to
know the scope of the holding and the purposes behind it in order to
determine whether and how it may bear on other, arguably analogous
disputes, and whether it foreshadows expansion or retrenchment of existing
principles. A full opinion gives lawyers and judges the nuance and texture
they need in order to predict the future course of the law."1
11. This list may not exhaust the functions performed by opinions. For example, opinions serve to
explain the decision to the parties, especially the loser. See, e.g., Lord Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers,
39 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1976); Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 810, 811 (1961). This aim may have independent significance, or it may be reduced to
one or more of the goals discussed in the text. In any event, for purposes of comparing American and
French opinions, the list of functions considered in the text seems sufficiently comprehensive to generate
a useful analysis. As will become apparent in Part III, French opinions do not explain the outcome to the
parties any more than they realize the aims discussed in the text.
12. KARL N. LLEwELLYN, TBE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEsA 26 (1960); see also
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The ime Charts of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 96, 99 (1959)
[hereinafter Hart, lime Charts]; Leflar, supra note 11, at 811.
13. See Hart, lime Charts, supra note 12, at 96, 99. Apart from giving directions to other
[Vol. 19: 81
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By providing an explanation, the reasoned opinion aids lawyers and lower
court judges in their daily work. Lawyers who can predict how later cases
will be decided can better steer their clients away from unnecessary and costly
legal battles with potentially disastrous consequences.' 4 When disputes do
arise, lower courts can decide more of them correctly in the first instance and
thus lighten the load of appellate courts and free them to direct their energies
to new problems rather than constantly revisiting old ones.'" In this way,
opinions that provide effective guidance can facilitate social and commercial
life by minimizing uncertainty about the content of legal rules.
2. Persuasion
Judges address opinions not only to lower courts and lawyers seeking
understanding and guidance, but also to other members of the panel, other
judges of equal rank, higher courts, judges in other jurisdictions, legislative
and executive officials, scholars, and the community at large. This audience
is interested not solely in obtaining guidance for the future, but also in finding
the best answers to legal questions. Accordingly, another aim of opinions,
especially in novel and important cases, is to persuade some or all of these
readers that the deciding court has reached the right result for the right
reasons.' 6 Judge Posner goes so far as to suggest that rhetorical power may
be a more important attribute of judicial excellence than analytical power.' 7
Quite apart from persuading others of the rightness of the outcome, the
task of composing an opinion obliges the judge who prepares it to think hard
about the outcome and the rationale for the decision.'" He may find that his
participants in the legal system, some opinions serve a purely pedagogical function. One of the talents that
separates the greatest judges from the merely competent ones is the ability to reach beyond the particulars
of the case before them, relate it to larger themes, and express the fundamental legal problems it presents
in a memorable and striking way. In this way the judge reaches out to a broader audience of lawyers and
even laypersons, offering guidance and understanding of the whole fabric of the law. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, CARDOZo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 55 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, REPUTATION]. Judicial
greatness is characterized by "[t]he power of vivid statement", which "lifts an opinion by a Cardozo, a
Holmes, a Learned Hand out of the swarm of humdrum, often numbing, judicial opinions, rivets attention,
crystallizes relevant concerns and considerations, provokes thought." Id. at 136.
14. See Leflar, supra note 11, at 811 (on importance of predictability); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
132-33 (tentative ed. 1958) (on importance of self-application of law); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 39 (1961) (suggesting that "principal functions of the law as a means of social control are.., to be
seen in the diverse ways in which law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court").
15. See William J. Palmer, Appellate Jurisprudence as Seen by a Trial Judge, 49 A.B.A. J. 882,
883 (1963).
16. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 132; see also JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING
HANDBOOK 3, 29, 76 (2d ed. 1986); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 153, 189 (1986); Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters with O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REv. 1828,
1849 (1983); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARv. L. REv. 887, 904-05 (1987).
17. POSNER, REPUTATION, supra note 13, at 136, 143.
18. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 11, at 810; Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work
of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. Cal. L. REv. 211, 218 (1957).
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intuitions about the proper disposition of the case, formed upon reading the
briefs and hearing oral argument, were incorrect or insufficiently precise. The
opinion "won't write" when it comes time to prepare a reasoned argument and
find authority for the legal propositions on which he had planned to rely.
Although this function of the opinion may be thought of as a disciplining
one, 9 it seems equally apt to characterize it as an aspect of the persuasive
function. It is the honest judge's effort to persuade himself of the rightness of
his original intuition, one that he may ultimately discard in favor of an
argument that he finds more convincing.
Some scholars maintain that opinions should be persuasive for a more
fundamental reason. A recent book by James Boyd White provides a good
illustration of this theme. White, a member of the law and literature
movement, argues that opinions must be persuasive in order to serve
democratic values. In his view, two central tasks of the judicial opinion are
to show respect for the human beings affected by the rules and to encourage
a kind of participatory democracy. Beginning with the distinction between
results and reasons, White maintains that the sorts of justifications offered
should count for at least as much in evaluating judicial performance as the
rulings themselves.2 ° In White's view, the key question to ask about an
opinion is whether it is "an authoritarian text, one that demands simple and
total obedience of its reader," or whether it "define[s] the reader as a person
with a mind, with a heart - as a free agent - who in reading the text is
encouraged to activate those capacities in certain ways."21 For White, it is
"essential to any legal system worthy of respect" that judicial opinions seek
to persuade rather than demand obedience from their readers.' White's
nightmare is a society in which people do not feel committed to any judicial
pronouncement, because they had no role in making it. Without opinions
containing persuasive reasons, we risk losing shared purpose and community
involvement and fostering widespread cynicism about legal institutions, if not
outright disrespect for the law.
3. Judicial Accountability
Judges are government officials wielding power over the lives and
fortunes of citizens. Like anyone else exercising control over others, judges
may overstep their bounds. Accidentally or on purpose, they may do
unjustified harm to the persons affected by their actions. One role of the
reasoned opinion is to constrain the potentially misguided or destructive
exercise of judicial power, for arbitrary or merely incorrect decisions are less
19. See Ruth B. Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. R v. 133, 139 (1990).
20. WHIE, JUsTICE As TRANSLATION, supra note 9, at 95-96, 102; see also Leflar, supra note 11,
at 812; Nagel, supra note 10, at 170-71.
21. WHIrE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION, supra note 9, at 101.
22. Id.
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likely to survive review by higher courts if the judge must expose his
reasoning to scrutiny. Since most American judges are not required by statute
to justify their actions in this way,' characterizing the. opinion as a con-
straint may be technically inaccurate. Even so, this theme appears as often as
any other in the commentary on opinion writing, 4 and the custom of writing
opinions is sufficiently well entrenched that flagrant departures from it are
rare.' The constraining role of opinions, like their persuasive function, is
also served by the custom of writing concurring and dissenting opinions. The
opportunity to write a dissent or offer an alternative ground for the outcome
provides the minority on a court with an opportunity to administer a public
rebuke to a wayward majority, and the threat of public exposure doubtlessly
deters some judges from doing what they please when their preferences
conflict with established law.
26
4. Legitimacy
Judicial "legitimacy" presents a related but more subtle problem. The
concern here is not to stop judges from departing from established law.
Sometimes no rule speaks directly to the case at hand, or the legal materials
point in more than one direction. Instead, the concern is how authority is
divided between judges and other governmental institutions: when should
judges go beyond the routine application of black-letter rules and exercise a
creative role in making new law? Fundamental values are in conflict and must
somehow be accommodated. On one side of the issue, democracy is a central
political value. Accordingly, governmental decisions, like legislative and
executive initiatives that are subject to citizen control at the ballot box, should
be made through processes that permit and encourage broad participation on
the part of citizens. At the same time, substantive considerations like fairness
and efficiency in the development and application of law may be ill served if
the judiciary waits for the legislature or executive to address a problem or
passively accepts an old, ambiguous, or hasty solution by the other govern-
mental branches.
23. See Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALF. L. REV. 486 (1930) (discussing
California as an exception to this general rule). Note, however, that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment may require some tribunals to give reasons for their actions. Cf. Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (discussing balancing test for determining procedural guarantees).
24. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 26-27, 27 n.19; RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 132 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE]; Ginsburg, supra note
19, at 143; Shapiro, supra note 8, at 737; Wald, supra note 16, at 904.
25. The custom does not apply to cases regarded as routine by the judges who decide them. Many
of these judgments are accompanied by cursory unpublished opinions normally available only to the
parties. The practice is not without critics. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial
Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 49-54.
26. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 27 & n.18.
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As a result, courts and legal philosophers alike struggle with the conflict
between majority rule and judicial activism.27 The issue is whether and in
what circumstances creative decisions by judges are a legitimate exercise of
judicial power, given that political choices in a democracy are normally
reserved for the legislature and executive. This problem is particularly critical
to the present inquiry, because some scholars maintain that adjudication differs
in kind from the activities of the other branches of government. These
scholars solve the legitimacy problem by stressing the process judges employ
in adjudication. The reasoned opinion plays a key role in justifying judicial
creativity.
28
In the 1950s, this proposition was a central tenet of the "Legal Process"
school. Theorists like Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, and Herbert Wechsler focused
on the role of reasons in distinguishing appropriate judicial creativity from
inappropriate judicial usurpations of the legislative function.' For Legal
Process theorists, the reasoned opinion helps to legitimate judicial creativ-
ity. 0 Some easy cases present no issues of basic principle and can be resolved
merely by applying settled rules mechanically in a brief opinion. Most cases
that reach appellate courts, however, require an extension of basic principles,
an examination of the ruling's place within the existing fabric of the law, and
a justification for the approach chosen. In this way judges demonstrate that
they are not merely enacting their own views into law, but are operating
within the narrowly circumscribed boundaries of the judicial function - a
function that is different in kind from the work of the other branches - and
therefore not usurping powers not delegated to them.
Ronald Dworkin offers another justification for the reasoned opinion. He
argues that "integrity" is a distinct political virtue, alongside justice and
fairness. Integrity requires government "to act in a principled and coherent
manner toward all its citizens. "31 Accordingly, "judges must conceive the
body of law they administer as a whole rather than as a set of discrete
decisions that they are free to make or amend one by one." 2 They must
avoid arbitrary distinctions between similar cases, and must search instead for
"some coherent principle whose influence then extends to the natural limits of
its authority. "" A political society that pursues this ideal thereby "promotes
its moral authority to assume and deploy a monopoly of coercive force."3 4
27. See HART, supra note 6, at 122-25.
28. See, e.g., WHrTE, supra note 9, at 95-96.
29. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Foms andLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365-71
(1978); HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 158-68; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, PoLIcs, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 21 (Herbert Wechsler ed.,
1961); see also White, Evolution, supra note 6, at 285-91.
30. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. Ci. L. REV.
779, 780, 792-98 (1989).
31. RONALD DWowKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 165 (1986).
32. Id. at 167.
33. Id. at 179.
34. Id. at 188.
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Reasoned opinions help ensure the success of this enterprise, for
"[i]ntegrity demands that the public standards of the community be both made
and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of
justice and fairness in the right relation."35 Without opinions that articulate
the reasons underlying decisions, readers will have difficulty tracing any
thread of principle running through them.36 Nor is the problem merely one
of appearances in a complex legal system with many judges, such as our own.
Even if judges were to strive for coherence without writing opinions, the
absence of reasoned argument would almost certainly produce a less integrated
body of law than that produced by a judicial tradition in which judges must
articulate their reasons and respond to criticisms.
B. A Note on the Importance of Candor
Whether a given opinion achieves the goals of providing guidance,
persuading readers, constraining arbitrariness, and legitimating judicial
invention depends in part on the talent and dedication judges bring to their
work. The measure of success, however, also has an ethical dimension, for
judges must be honest with their readers.37 Some American scholars maintain
that key ends served by opinion writing cannot be achieved in the absence of
candor. For example, from the perspective of guidance, a decision that gives
false reasons is necessarily an unreliable guide to the future, because the real,
but concealed, reasons and not the false ones will actually determine the
resolution of later cases decided by the same judges.3"
In the long run, it is often futile for a judge to try to use false reasons to
persuade others to take his side. Someone might be tricked into accepting an
argument that rests on false reasons, but the success of the deception may not
endure. Anyone who pays attention to a court's work over time would
recognize that the argument was not sincere if it is not applied consistently in
similar situations. In addressing the public at large, candor is equally
important, for only by being honest with people do judges treat them with
respect,39 and win respect in return. If a lie is found out, and some lies
surely will be, the aim of achieving greater public acceptance of judicial
decisions is irreparably harmed. Like most victims of deception, citizens who
35. Id. at 219.
36. Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847, 865-66 (1987)
(book review) (describing Dworkin's approach as "a jurisprudence of reasons," since "it is the point and
not the rule that constrains").
37. See Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 721 (1979); Shapiro, supra
note 8, at 731. While there is general agreement on the value of candor in judicial decisionmaking, and
no one enthusiastically promotes judicial lying, some commentators do express reservations about the
viability or wisdom of absolute fidelity to truth. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 296 (1990), and the sources cited at 297 n.2.
38. See Kathleen Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Process and State
Court Jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 917, 934.
39. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 736.
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trusted judges will feel betrayed, and will probably be less likely to trust a
judge even when one offers an honest argument in the future.
Candor helps the opinion serve its function as a guarantee against the
arbitrary or otherwise inappropriate exercise of judicial authority. If judges
do not give the real reasons for their actions, it is harder to determine whether
they are acting properly. One must first ascertain that the grounds offered are
false, then uncover the true grounds. Neither of these inquiries is likely to
yield a certain conclusion, and bad judges surely succeed sometimes in acting
arbitrarily by hiding their true reasons. While the simple obligation to give
reasons provides the critic with a starting point for evaluating a judge's work,
an independent requirement of judicial candor can better control the exercise
of judicial power.'
As for legitimacy, the judge's duty is to respect the central difference
between adjudication on the one hand, and legislation or executive acts on the
other. Since the judicial process differs from other governmental action by its
commitment to reason, again the reasons given must be real ones. Otherwise,
the exercise of giving reasons becomes a hollow formality, thus eliminating
any substantive difference between adjudication and legislation. As David
Shapiro points out, "[J]udges who regard themselves as free to distort or
misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of criticism and
condemnation that honest disclosure of their motivation may entail."41
I. FRENCH OPINIONS
French opinions differ significantly from the American model, both in
style and in structure. Rather than a reasoned and candid essay, an opinion in
the highest courts is a terse and opaque summary of the outcome and the
reasons for it. The differences are not merely stylistic. They reflect a
fundamental difference in the way French and American judges conceive of
the judicial decision. For many Americans, the opinion is a vehicle for setting
forth the judges' views of the substantive considerations bearing on the
outcomes of cases, as well as the interplay between policy concerns and such
formal constraints as precedent and rules. French judges begin from a
radically different premise. In their view, the role of the opinion is to apply
settled law to the facts, or rather, to create the appearance that the court is
merely applying law to fact. French judges treat application as a matter of
mere deductive logic.42
40. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1,
25 (1979).
41. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 737.
42. See PIER Mmu, LE STYLE DFS JUGEMENTs 288-89 (4th ed. 1978).
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A. Characteristics of the French Opinion
For purposes of illustration, I first discuss the text of Jand'heur v. Les
Galeries Belfortaises,'4 a famous case in French tort law from the highest
French private law court, the Cour de Cassation. In it, the Court interpreted
Article 1384 of the Civil Code' as imposing liability without fault upon an
actor for injuries caused by an object under the actor's control.45 Although
the case is sixty years old, the court continues to follow the form used in that
case.
THE COURT: - Deciding with all the chambers united; - On the issue raised by the
[appeal]: - See paragraph 1 of article 1384 of the Civil Code; - Whereas the presumption
of responsibility established by that article as to one who has under his guard an inanimate
object that has caused harm to another can be rebutted only by proving an [unforeseen
event], aforce majeure, or a cause etrang~re that cannot be imputed to him; as it does not
suffice to prove that he did not commit any fault or that the cause of the harmful act has not
been ascertained; - Whereas, on April 22, 1925, a truck belonging to the Compagnie Les
Galeries Belfortaises knocked down and injured the minor Lise Jand'heur; as the challenged
decision refused to apply the article cited above on the ground that an accident caused by
an automobile in movement, under the impulsion and direction of an individual, does not
constitute, so long as it has not been shown that the accident was due to a defect in the
automobile, the act of an object that one has under his guard within the meaning of
paragraph 1 of article 1384, and that, in consequence, the victim must, in order to obtain
compensation for the injury, establish a fault imputable to the driver; - But whereas the
law does not distinguish, for purposes of application of the presumption that it has
established, whether the object that caused the harm was or was not put in motion by man;
as it is not necessary that there be a defect in the object capable of causing the damage as
article 1384 attaches the responsibility to the guard of the object, not to the object itself; -
From which it follows that, in ruling as it did, the challenged decision reversed the legal
burden of proof and violated the article of law cited above.
43. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1930, Cass. ch. r6un., 1930 S. Jur. 1121, reprinted in 2 F.H. LAWSON
& B.S. MARKEsINIs, ToRTIous LAILrfY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE
CIVIL LAW 271-72 (1982), and translated in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM 631 (2d ed. 1977). Von Mehren and Gordley's book contains a large number of translated
French (and German) opinions, as well as other materials bearing on the French (and German) legal
systems. For more recent examples, consult any collection of French opinions from the Cour de Cassation
or the Conseil d'ttat. See, e.g., HENRI CAPrrANT, LES GRANDS ARRrS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE
(Alex Weill et al. eds., 8th ed. 1984); LES GRANDS ARRtTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE
(Marceau Long et al. eds., 8th ed. 1984).
44. From time to time during the course of this article, it will be useful to have at hand the following
provisions of the French Civil Code on tortious responsibility:
Art. 1382: Any act of a person which causes damage to another makes him by whose fault the
damage occurred liable to make reparation for the damage.
Art. 1383: Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his acts, but also by his
negligence or imprudence.
Art. 1384: A person is liable not only for the damage he causes by his own act, but also for that
caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible or of things that he has under his care.
[Other parts of Article 1384 hold parents liable for damage caused by their children, employers liable
for damage caused by their employees, and artisans liable for damage caused by their apprentices. Parents
and artisans escape liability if they "can prove that they could not have prevented the act that gives rise
to this liability."]
Art. 1385: The owner of an animal, or the person using it during the period of usage, is liable for
the damage the animal has caused, whether it was under his guard or whether it had strayed or escaped.
C. cIv. arts. 1382-85.
45. For earlier doctrinal developments, see generally VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at
594-98.
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- For these reasons, quash ... [remand] before the Cour d'appel of Dijon.
Quite unlike its common law counterpart, the French opinion must meet
a host of formal requirements. As Jand'heur illustrates, the French judicial
opinion style consists of strict deductive reasoning: the court applies abstract
premises to the facts of the case at hand, arriving at a conclusion that the
lower court erred (as here) or acted correctly.47 In the highest courts, the
major premise of the deductive argument is typically a general principle of
law referenced to a provision of the Civil Code - Article 1384 in our
example. The reader must consult the Code to learn that Article 1384
concerns liability for harm done by an object under the actor's control. The
minor premise is the decision under review, in this case a ruling by the lower
court that Article 1384 does not impose liability without fault for harm done
by a vehicle under the defendant's control. The conclusion is the court's
judgment on whether the decision is compatible with the Code. Here the court
held that Article 1384 does indeed impose liability without fault for car
accidents. Jand'heur was, in fact, a major step in the development of a
general rule of strict liability for harms done by objects under the actor's
control.48
Besides its strictly deductive form, the French opinion normally follows
other formal requirements as well. The reasoning underlying the important
decision in Jand'heur is radically compressed. This is in part a consequence
of the rule that the decision must consist of a single sentence, with the court
as its subject and the disposition of the appeal as its verb. In Jand'heur, the
verb of the court's sentence is "quash" (the decision below). Had the court
chosen to uphold the lower court, it would have used the verb "reject" (the
appeal). Other common verbs include "condemn," "order," "declare," and
"deny." A judge should pay close attention to the construction of this
sentence, for "[a] judicial sentence must link sobriety, clarity, conciseness,
elegance, to rigor, correctness, and dignity."'"4 If a case requires the
consideration of a number of separate issues, each governed by a different
verb, the court may not be able to dispose of it in a single sentence without
undue awkwardness. In that event, the court will separate the decision into
two or more parts and compose a separate sentence for each issue.50
46. VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 631 (deletion in original).
47. See, e.g., FRANOIS-MIcBEL SCHROEDER, LE NouvEAu STYLE JuDIciAmE 71 (1978); Jean-
Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and the U.S.A., 24 AM. J. CoMp. L.
43, 45 (1976). This structure is modeled on the formula used by Roman praetors to hand down legal
directives. See Tony Sauvel, Histoire dujugement motivg, 71 REVUE DU DRorr PUauc ET DE LA SCIENCE
POLMQJE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 5, 7-8 (1955).
48. See generally Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Acts of Things: A Study of
Judicial Lawmaaking, 48 LA. L. REV. 1299 (1988).
49. PIEm EsToup, LEs JUGEMEmts CvILs 15 (1988).
50. MRmN, supra note 42, at 137. Elsewhere, Professor Mimin counsels, "It is necessary to assure
the unity of each phrase by developing only one idea in it." Id. at 180.
Another consequence of these rules is that imperative, exclamatory, and interrogatory sentences are
forbidden. See id. at 173, 192.
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Under France's new Code of Civil Procedure, courts have an obligation
to "motivate," or explain, their decisions. 5 Accordingly, they incorporate
the reasons for their holdings into the sentence by subordinate clauses
beginning with "whereas," as in Jand'heur.52 By limiting the opinion to a
single carefully constructed sentence, French judges hope to avoid ambiguity.
Although the elements of the court's reasoning may be hard to sort out on the
first reading, rules of grammar assure that all of the clauses are linked into
a coherent deductive argument. Everything in the sentence must be either part
of the result or its justification. The French view this approach as preferable
to a discursive essay setting down a string of sentences or paragraphs followed
by a result that may depend on all or some of them.53 The writer of such an
essay, i.e., an American- or English-style opinion, may too easily avoid
making the precise logical links that are essential to a well-crafted decision.
Manuals on French opinion writing stress the importance of clarity,54
which seems odd in light of the rule that the opinion be compressed into one
highly complex sentence. Clarity might be better served by encouraging
judges to employ a direct narrative style, to separate their thoughts into a
number of sentences, and to elaborate on each, instead of cramming them all
into "whereas" clauses. But this objection misses the point. However desirable
clarity may be, in the hierarchy of opinion-writing virtues, the premier goal
for French judges is that the decision take the form of a deductive argument.
Given that requirement, and the danger of confusion that this style presents,
judges must make the single sentence as lucid as possible.
The French preoccupation with eliminating unnecessary words from the
opinion and with selecting precisely the right word for the occasion seems to
be based largely on this concern. Pierre Mimin's manual on opinion writing,
Le Style des Jugements, illustrates the French perspective. Professor Mimin
states that the judge should strive for "an elementary nobility of language""5
and "the maximum of density."56 He rails against redundancy, 57 meta-
phors," "provincialisms, '"" "vulgar decorations,"60 and any and all ambi-
guity,6 imprecision,' or superfluity 3 in the use of words. By contrast,
51. Nouv. c. PR. civ. art. 455.
52. See MIMIN, supra note 42, at 185-87. The Cour de Cassation uses the phrases attendu que and
que ("that") for short, the latter after the first subordinate clause. Another high court, the Conseil d'ttat,
adjudicates issues arising between the government and the citizen. It follows the same form, but uses the
phrase considerant que to introduce subordinate clauses. Both of these terms are usually translated as
"whereas." See VON MEH-nN & GORDLEY, supra note 43.
53. See VON MEHEN & GORDLEY, supra note 43 at 87-88, 310; Marcel Waline, La Motivation des
Ddcisions de Justice, in 2 MftLANGES STRATIS ANDRtEATIS 545, 550-51 (1973).
54. See, e.g., ESTOUP, supra note 49, at 31; MIMIN, supra note 42, at 134, 137.
55. MIMIN, supra note 42, at 82.
56. Id. at 99.
57. Id. at 96, 99, 116.
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id. at 94-95.
60. Id. at 112.
61. Id. at 134.
19941
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the authors of American opinion-writing manuals satisfy themselves with a
few bromides about writing style." American judges give lip service, and
occasionally real respect, to the rules of English composition, but no careful
reader of their work would claim that the bulk of it is distinguished for its
stylistic precision and elegance.65
From an American perspective, the most striking feature of Jand'heur
may be the lack of any discussion of the substantive reasons behind the Cour
de Cassation's move to strict liability.6 A roughly analogous American
decision is Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,67 a California tort case in
which Justice Traynor, in a concurring opinion, proposed a strict liability rule
for defective products. Escola contains a trenchant account of the policy
justifications for liability without fault. According to Justice Traynor,
"[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products
that reach the market, '6 and "where the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot."69
Furthermore, "the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." 0 The opinion goes
on to discuss other reasons, such as the justice of imposing liability on the
manufacturer who is responsible for the dangerous product reaching the
market, and the manufacturer's greater access to information about his
products.71
No such policy analysis appears in the French opinion. The judge
announces the general principles upon which the decision is based as though
they were self-evident, and the opinion merely applies those principles to the
case at hand: "[Tihe language is of assertion, not of argument. But more than
this, it is existential and descriptive, not normative and prescriptive. "7 One
of the premises of the deductive argument may contain a few words that hint
at the substantive foundations of the decision,73 but full-blown policy
62. Id. at 113.
63. Ia at 99-100, 107-08.
64. George underscores the contrast between the approach taken by French and American attitudes:
"When it comes to judicial writing style, each writer must develop his own best way to say what has to
be said." GEORGE, supra note 16, at 7; see also B.E. WrrKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS
205-06 (1977).
65. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 107-09 (1985)
[hereinafter POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS].
66. Jand'heur is only one of several cases in the development of Article 1384 as a principle of strict
liability. The other cases are no more informative. Some of them are reprinted, along with other materials
bearing on this theme, in VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 612-90.
67. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
68. Id. at 440.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 441.
71. Id. at 442-44.
72. Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France, and Soviet Russia, 48 TUL. L. REV.
1010, 1023 (1974).
73. See id. at 1021 (citing Cour de Cassation's affirmance of rescuer's recovery because "the victim
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arguments based on economic, social, or political considerations have no place
in the opinion.74 They are deemed "useless to the decision of the case."75
Nor should the opinion contain citations to earlier cases or to scholarship,76
rhetorical turns designed to persuade the reader of the rightness of the
outcome,77 or even general discussions of legal concepts.
7
1
As a result, French opinions evidence nothing comparable to the detailed
historical essays found in American opinions, like the habeas corpus survey
in Fay v. Noia.79 They contain no sweeping discussions of prior doctrine,
like the U.S. Supreme Court's essay on the Equal Protection Clause in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 0 and no elaborate
treatments of the policies underlying freedom of speech like the opinion in
New York Times v. Sullivan."' Such disquisitions .on legal concepts as
Benjamin Cardozo's meditation on duty of care in Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R.8 2 and Learned Hand's delineation of the negligence rule in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co. 3 would be out of place in a French opinion.
American opinions may be written narrowly to decide only the case at
hand, or broadly to influence or even transform a whole area of doctrineY
Unlike the American practice, virtually all French opinions focus narrowly on
the issue at hand and no other. 5 Broad principles of law, like the interpreta-
tion of Article 1384 embodied in Jand'heur, typically are invoked as reasons
for the decision, but never as part of the holding itself. 86 French judges are
not permitted to rule on any issue not raised by the parties.8 Digressions,88
displays of indignation or enthusiasm, 9 "puerile reflections,"90 indications
of indecision or doubt,9 pontification about the state of the law,9" verbs
was obliged to compensate the damages sustained by one who lent assistance through benevolence").
Professor Rudden points out that a policy of encouraging rescue can be derived from the inclusion of the
word "benevolence" in this phrase. Id. at 1022.
74. See, e.g., MuiMN, supra note 42, at 255-56; SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 66.
75. MRIMN, supra note 42, at 255.
76. Id. at 274.
77. Id. at 192, 207.
78. Id. at 288.
79. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
80. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
82. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
83. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
84. But see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The
Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon
it for decision.... The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.").
85. See MInMN, supra note 42, at 337; SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 64-65.
86. MIMIN, supra note 42, at 337.
87. Id. at 397.
88. Id. at 222.
89. Id. at 247.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id. at 20.
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suggesting the exercise of judgment by the judge,' and expressions of
sympathy94 are all frowned upon.95 The concern underlying these rules and
practices seems to be to maintain the image of the judge as a technician who
mechanically applies existing law to a factual situation, rather than as a social
engineer who exercises judgment and lays down general rules of conduct.
French opinions contain no dissents or concurring opinions, and the
author of the decision remains anonymous.96 Anonymity and collegial
decisionmaking are regarded as necessary safeguards of judicial independence
and impartiality.97 In addition, it is feared that allowing dissenting opinions
would "weaken considerably the authority of the decision. "9
Lower court opinions differ somewhat from those of the Cour de
Cassation. Generally, civil juries do not exist in France, so judges in the
lowest courts must evaluate the evidence and make findings of fact. The
intermediate appellate courts review these findings de novo. As a result, the
opinions of intermediate appellate courts often contain fairly extensive
discussions of the evidence. The Cour de Cassation, by contrast, ordinarily
does not rule on the facts.99 Because its role in the legal system is to nullify
incorrect rulings of law, ordinarily it examines the facts only to ascertain
whether the lower court properly applied the law to the facts."° Conse-
quently, the opinions of the Cour de Cassation contain only a sketchy account
of the facts. Again, the brief reference in Jand'heur to the road accident at
issue in that case is typical.
Opinions of the Cour de Cassation are shorter than those of lower courts
in their treatment of the law as well as of the facts. 10' Lower courts must
justify their rulings to the higher courts."°2 While limiting themselves to
deductive arguments, lower courts often set forth elaborate chains of
reasoning to show the reviewing court that they are right. The Cour de
Cassation, in contrast, generally prefers to get right to the heart of the matter.
It will characteristically "pose an axiom and immediately draw from it the
required deduction."" It seems to view its role in the legal system as one
of declaring results, and perceives no need to persuade anyone of their
correctness. The contrast between French and American practice is striking:
93. Id. at 260.
94. Id. at 257.
95. By contrast, such displays of judicial emotion are commonplace in American opinions. See
WrrmN, supra note 64, at 209-11.
96. See MIMIN, supra note 42, at 370; John Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in
France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1763 (1988).
97. Bell, supra note 96, at 1776; Waline, supra note 53, at 551.
98. SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 66.
99. See id. at 67.
100. MARIE-N6ELLE JOBARD-BACHELUIER & XAVIER BACHELLIER, LA TECHNIQUE DE CASSATION
60-63 (1989). The authors note that the Cour de Cassation exercises this power in certain cases and not
others, according to "criteria that are not always easy to define." Id. at 63.
101. MmuN, supra note 42, at 216-17.
102. See SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 5.
103. MIMIN, supra note 42, at 217.
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in America, courts of last resort, and notably the U.S. Supreme Court,
routinely prepare far more elaborate opinions in support of their holdings than
do lower courts.
B. Criticisms of the French Form
Judged by the American standards described in Part II, the French
opinion falls short. This section discusses its weaknesses. It would be a
mistake, however, to conclude from these weaknesses that unreasoned
opinions produce serious adverse consequences for the legal system. Whether
and how much reasoned opinions matter to the success of the legal system is
a separate question. Satisfying American standards may be less vital than
many American judges and theorists suppose. That issue is addressed in Part
IV.
If the French Civil Code contained straightforward answers to the legal
issues that make their way to the Cour de Cassation, French judicial form
would be adequate to serve the needs of the legal system. The reader of an
opinion would merely need to refer to the Code or some other relevant statute
cited by the court for the information left out of the opinion. In fact, the
reader's task is not so easy. Although the form and structure of French
judicial opinions mask judicial invention, scholars and even some judges
openly acknowledge the creative role of courts."° The French Code is no
more comprehensive, free of ambiguity, or up-to-date than American statutes;
it is often far less so. Judges make much of French law, and the text of the
Code serves as no more than a starting point.105
Jand'heur's reading of Article 1384 as imposing a kind of strict
liability - a highly improbable interpretation if the framers' intent is at all
relevant" - is only one of many examples. Apart from the four Code
provisions noted earlier,0 7 virtually all of French tort law is based on
judicial decisions and academic writing. Courts also have made significant
contributions to the development of private law on unjust enrichment, specific
performance of contractual obligations, and many other aspects of the law of
104. See, e.g., S. BELTAD, ESSAI SUR LE POUVOIR CREATEUR ET NORMATIF DU JUGE (1974); Alain
Bancaud, Considirations sur une "pleuse hypocrisie*., la forme des arrets de la Cour de Cassation, 7
DROr ET SoCIETA 373, 383-84 (1987) (observing that judge imposes his order upon chaos of social life,
while refusing to explain his reasons for doing so); see also Bell, supra note 96, at 1778 & n.45.
105. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE Crvil LAW TRADITION 83 (2d ed. 1985); Rend
David, Supereminent Principles in French Law, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN
CrvIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 119-32 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974) [hereinafter JUDICIAL DECI-
sIONS]; Andrd Tune, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459, 465-66 (1976)
[hereinafter Tune, Methodology]; Andr6 Tune, Logique et Politique dans l'dlaboration du droit,
spdcialement en matihre de responsabilitg civile, in MfLANGES JEAN DABIN 317-39 (1974) [hereinafter
Tune, Logique et Politique].
106. See ALAN WATSON, FAILURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 1-33 (1988).
107. See supra note 44.
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contracts.' Indeed, "it would be hard to find a single article of the Civil
Code to which there have not been added depths of meaning and major
restrictions and extensions that could not have been foreseen in 1804. "19
French public law is even more a product of judicial action. Relations
between the citizen and the state, governed in the United States mainly by
constitutional and statutory law, are governed in France primarily by
subconstitutional administrative law. Most of this law is made by the Conseil
d'ttat, a court that evolved out of the bureaucracy in the early nineteenth
century."0 This body of law began as and has largely remained a product
of judicial invention, no more based on statute than is English or American
common law."' Yet the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat are, if anything, less
informative than those of the Cour de Cassation.
When a court goes beyond the mechanical application of a readily
accessible text to engage in creative interpretation or sheer invention, all of
the justifications discussed in Part II for reasoned opinions come into play.
Full explanations provide guidance for lawyers, persuade other judges and
citizens that the court is acting sensibly, guard against the danger that the
court will act illegally, and justify judicial creativity against the charge of
usurpation of legislative prerogatives. The problem is not that French law is
overly formal in its jurisprudential premises. Rather, the problem is with
French judicial style. French law is not as formal as the opinions would have
us think. French courts do not even acknowledge their creative role, let alone
give the reasoned opinions that a creative role entails.
French judicial form does not lack for critics of its inaccessibility, lack
of candor, and absence of policy discussion.Y2 The most prominent attack
in French legal literature appears in an article by two distinguished French
jurists, Adolphe Touffait and Andr6 Tunc."3 They maintain that, because
of the brevity and opacity of French decisions, the case law is rife with
unexplained and seemingly arbitrary distinctions, outmoded principles, and
impenetrable doctrinal thickets." 4 For example, French and foreign com-
mentators agree that the Court's efforts to construct a principle of strict
liability in tort under Article 1384, without writing reasoned opinions to set
forth the relevant policy considerations and explain the Court's grounds for
108. See Tune, Methodology, supra note 105, at 465; see also Renaud Baguenault de Puchesse, The
Warranty of Quality in Sale of Goods Under the Perspective of the American and French Law 132-33
(1989) (unpublished thesis on file with author) (noting that 'the French law as regards the hidden defect
warranty is primarily based on judicial precedents," as are rules on "warranty disclaimers, available
remedies in case of breach of warranty and warranty beneficiaries").
109. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 401 (1968).
110. See, e.g., L. NEVILLE BROWN &J. F. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 28-31 (3d ed.
1983).
111. See David, supra note 105, at 120-21.
112. See, e.g., SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 65.
113. Adolphe Touffait & Andr6 Tune, Pour une motivation plus explicite des ddcisions de justice
et surtout celles de la cour de cassation, 72 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROrr CIVILE 487 (1974).
114. Id. at 496-99.
[Vol. 19: 81
1994] French and American Judicial Opinions 101
decision, has resulted in a chaotic body of law.115 One French scholar calls
the whole enterprise "an immense waste of intelligence and of time."
116
John Dawson is equally critical of French form. Bringing the perspective
of a common law scholar to his analysis of the French opinion, Professor
Dawson stresses the breadth of the terse motifs set forth as justifications for
French decisions and the sketchiness with which the Cour de Cassation treats
the facts:
Propositions of law are drafted with utmost care and precision but they hang suspended in
space, for no effort is made to reconcile them with very different propositions asserted in
other, nearly related cases or to explain why they would not apply if the facts of the case
were somewhat different."1 7
Because the Court makes no effort to reconcile the sweeping language of its
motifs with arguably conflicting propositions applied in other cases, lower
courts are left with nothing to rely on except the Court's bare holdings in their
search for guidance on how the high court will decide future cases."'
The absence of factual development in the Court's opinions means that
lower courts lack the means to test the scope of the reasons offered in one
case by debating their applicability to different facts. As a result, the
opportunity to achieve legitimacy through reasoned decisionmaking is
lost. "' French judges appear to be powerless technicians mechanically
applying the law. In reality, at least in the highest French courts, the judges'
failure to undertake a serious effort to provide reasoned justifications for their
decisions gives them much greater power to exercise unfettered discretion than
American judges possess.'
The root of the problem is the lack of honesty in French opinions. French
disregard for judicial frankness diverges sharply from the American view that
candor is at the very least an important criterion for judging judicial
performance, and perhaps even an essential requisite of the judicial function
in all but exceptional cases.' 2' French manuals on opinion writing disparage
115. For example, whether a given fact pattern is governed by Article 1384 or by some other body
of law is often quite difficult to determine. In one case a customer at a supermarket picked up a bottle and
was injured when it exploded before she reached the check-out counter. Arguably, the bottle was under
the store's control and Article 1384 should have governed. Yet the Court of Cassation rejected the
application of Article 1384 with one phrase: "The liability of [the defendant] to the victim could only be
contractual." See Rudden, supra note 72, at 1022.
Similarly, in spite of the strict liability rule of Jand'heur, defendants may prevail by showing that
unforeseeable conditions played a major role in bringing about the harm. If the defendant driver could not
foresee rocks on the roadway, he would not be liable when his wheel throws up a rock that shatters the
plaintiff's windshield. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 646-47. If a road suddenly and
unforeseeably becomes icy, the defendant is not liable for harm done by his car in a skid. Id. at 650.
Whatever the merits of these decisions, they are hard to square with the principle of strict liability.
116. Touffait & Tunc, supra note 113, at 496 (quoting Carbonnier, 4 DRoIT CIVIL no. 109 (7th ed.
1972)).
117. DAwsON, supra note 109, at 414.
118. Id. at 408-10.
119. Id. at 412-13.
120. Id. at 411-12, 415.
121. Shapiro, supra note 8.
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efforts to state the real grounds of decision behind the syllogistic fagade of the
French opinion. Professor Schroeder considers it more important that the law
seem firm and secure than that courts be candid." He recognizes that
answers to most legal issues cannot be deduced from the Code or other
texts,123 yet insists that judges leave the social, economic, and political
determinants of decisions out of their opinions. Schroeder explains that
judges' education does not prepare them for that kind of discussion, and that
open debate of these matters would politicize decisionmaking and make case
resolution more difficult. 24 He claims, without citation, that the French
style "occasions more admiration than disdain on the part of foreign
observers, be they Anglo-Saxon or Germanic.""
Professor Mimin is an even more enthusiastic defender of the French
form, despite its sometime dishonesty. At every turn in his long list of rules
for opinion writing, he denigrates candor in favor of maintaining appear-
ances. 26 For example, policy arguments figure prominently in the adjudica-
tion of French tort cases. 27 Yet Mimin insists that one should never set
forth the policy considerations behind a decision.22 Nor should a judge use
the term "hereafter" when applying a new rule, for the implication is that the
rule used to be otherwise (as indeed it was)."z It is inappropriate to express
doubt or indecision,1 30 or to use a verb that would lead the reader to think
that a judge is exercising judgment,' 3' or to include anything "favorable to
the antithesis."132 A judge may use reasons found in scholarship or case law,
but must not acknowledge their provenance131 or admit that the holdings of
the cases differ from the text of the Code. 34 His examples of overly lengthy
opinions are not always illustrations of redundancy and verboseness. Often
they are cases in which the judge has given the reader more useful informa-
tion regarding the facts, reasoning, and disposition than Mimin thinks strictly
necessary.
35
Adolphe Touffait, Andr6 Tunc, and John Dawson call for reform of the
French opinion. They prefer the American model. My goal is rather different.
In detailing the ways in which the French opinion falls short of American
122. SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 121-22.
123. Id. at 85.
124. Id. at 66. Admitting that judges resort to such considerations, he asks, rhetorically, "But would
there be any advantage in explaining oneself openly in this regard?" Id.
125. Id. at 67.
126. MIMIN, supra note 42, at 246.
127. See 2 LAWSON & MARKESHNS, supra note 43, at 45, 50-51, 54, 60-61, 63, 68-69, 153, 156.
128. MIMN, supra note 42, at 255-56.
129. Id. at 220-21.
130. Id. at 264.
131. Id. at 260. He uses as an example the verb estimer.
132. Id. at 222.
133. Id. at 274. Mimin declares that cases do not establish principles of law, but continues, "At least,
that is a phenomenon that one does not proclaim." Id.
134. Id. at 275.
135. See id. at 185-86, 330.
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ideals, my aim is not to criticize French practice. On the contrary, I belabor
the inadequacies of French form only to build a foundation for casting doubt
upon the American standards by which it is judged. In Part IV, I will argue
that the French legal system gets along well enough despite these terse
opinions, thereby raising the question of whether American opinion-writing
ideals are as important as many Americans suppose. Before undertaking that
project, however, it will be useful to examine the history of French judicial
form, in an effort to understand why French judges write such seemingly
curious opinions.
C. Understanding the French Opinion
It seems fair, if somewhat harsh, to characterize French judicial form as
a dysfunctional and deceptive fagade, behind which judges exercise a creative
role without offering genuinely reasoned explanations. French opinions give
little guidance and speak with the voice of command rather than persuasion.
Because of the judges' lack of candor, the opinion cannot serve as a constraint
on judicial power, and the absence of reasoning in the opinions means that
judicial invention cannot even begin to meet the charge of illegitimacy. How
did this state of affairs come about, and how can it persist? Why is there no
rebellion against the perverse features of French judicial form?
One reason is the need for efficiency in managing litigation. Because the
Cour de Cassation has little power to decline to hear a dispute presented to it,
it must rule on an enormous number of cases. 36 Given this workload, the
burden of preparing reasoned opinions in every case would be overwhelming.
This response, however, is hardly satisfactory, since one could remedy the
administrative problems by according the highest courts discretion to deny
review of cases deemed insufficiently important, increasing the number of
judges, or giving judges more assistants to help them handle the work. Full
opinions could be reserved for the most important cases, as they increasingly
are in the United States. In short, something more fundamental than a heavy
docket accounts for the persistence of the French opinion form.
This section argues that the structure of the French opinion is shaped by
two powerful events in French political history: the absolute monarchy and the
Revolution of 1789. If this conclusion is valid, it prompts us to reconsider the
American opinion as well. Part V will suggest that American judicial form
may be better understood as a product of our political culture and history,
than as an instrument for realizing the goals described in Part II.
136. See Tunc, Methodology, supra note 105, at 467 (noting that in mid-1970s the court, which
consists of over a hundred judges divided into several chambers, ruled on over six thousand civil cases
a year).
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1. The Revolution and the Judges
Whether America had a true revolution is an issue debated by histo-
rians. 137 But no one disputes the revolutionary character of the events of
1789-94 in France. The French people turned their society and government
upside down in a fierce struggle, vandalized churches, expropriated property,
abolished ancient privileges, and chased thousands of supporters of the old
regime out of the country or sent them to the guillotine. To understand French
judicial form, one must recognize that the judges were on the losing side of
this upheaval. The events of those years left a deep and abiding imprint not
only on judges' approach to their work, but also on popular attitudes toward
judges and their role in government.
Before the Revolution, a group of high courts in France, the parlements,
exercised both judicial and legislative functions, subject to supervision by the
crown.13 France developed no viable representative institutions comparable
to the elected English Parliament. In this void, the quasi-legislative, quasi-
judicial parlements increasingly viewed themselves as the defenders of the
rights of the French against royal aggrandizement. They did not, however,
concern themselves much with the rights of peasants and workers. In the late
eighteenth century, as France faced a mounting fiscal crisis, the rights that the
parlements deemed worthy of protection were the privileges of the nobility
under the old regime,139 and the intrusions they fought were efforts by the
king and his ministers to find resources with which to stave off national
bankruptcy.
1
When the monarchy collapsed, the parlements were abolished. Some of
theparlementaires were executed and others fled the country. Judicial prestige
sank to a low point from which it has never fully recovered. The men who
assumed power during the Revolution held a highly positivistic theory of law
in which the legislature played the dominant role of lawmaker.141 They
proclaimed that the sovereign power of the state resided in the legislature, 
1 41
and that the role of courts was merely to carry out the legislature's directions.
Maximilien Robespierre, one of the revolutionary leaders, declared: "The
word jurisprudence [meaning case law] of the courts ... must be effaced
from our language."143
137. For a recent argument that the War for Independence was indeed a revolution, see GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992).
138. See FR. OLVimR-MARTIN, HIsTOIIE DU DROrr FRANcAis 538-45 (1951).
139. These privileges included, for example, immunities from taxation, seigneurial rights to collect
fees from local peasants, and the exclusive access to high positions in the military. See PIERRE GouBERT,
THE ANCIEN PGrmE: FRENCH SOCIETY 1600-1750, at 162-65 (Steve Cox trans., 1973).
140. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 34142 (citing MARCEL WALUNE, TRArrg
fLtmNTAImE DE DRorr ADMINISTRATIF 44-45 (6th ed. 1951)).
141. See SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 85.
142. MERRYMAN, supra note 99, at 22; VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 248 (citing
J. LAFERRItRE, MANUEL DE DRorr CONST1TUTIONNEL 311-12 (2d ed. 1947)).
143. DAWSON, supra note 109, at 426.
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The revolutionary government kept judges on a short leash. Before the
Revolution, judicial opinions typically did not contain any reasons at all. The
new government insisted on reasons in order to ensure that judges did not
stray from the established law. It forbade judges from issuing general rules,
barred any judicial review of legislation, and instructed judges to "have
recourse to the legislative body whenever they think it necessary, either to
interpret a law or to make a new one."1" Judges were elected by popular
vote for short terms, and were forbidden to interfere with the administration
of government. 
145
The revolutionary leaders were reluctant to establish an appellate court,
for fear that it might become a center of political opposition to the regime.
However, the practical difficulties of keeping the lower courts in line without
some reviewing body were too great, so they established a "tribunal of
cassation." This body was not permitted to rule on the merits, but only to
"quash" (casser) erroneous decisions of lower courts and remand the case to
a different lower court for reconsideration. This feature of French procedure
endures to this day.1" Each year the tribunal sent representatives before the
legislature to present a summary of its actions and "the text of the law that led
to cassation."147 The law was codified in 1804 partly to curb judicial power
by assuring that judges had a text to apply rather than authority to make law
on their own. 
148
Working under these conditions, French courts quite naturally took pains
to avoid giving the impression that they exercised any kind of creative role.
The austere, syllogistic opinion form, which originated in this period,
represented the judges' effort to fend off any suggestion of judicial departure
from legislative texts and established law.149 The impact of the events of the
1790s persisted in France, for the Revolution was not a transitory phenome-
non. Although French government went through many phases before a stable
republic finally was formed in the 1870s, revolutionary attitudes toward the
144. D6cret sur l'organisation judiciaire of 16-24 August 1790, tit. II, art. 12, quoted in VON
MEHREN & GoRDLY, supra note 43, at 217.
145. DAWSON, supra note 109, at 376. The lesson has not been forgotten. Mimin's manual on
opinion writing includes warnings against criticizing the administration or the sovereign. See MIMIN, supra
note 42, at 236, 239.
146. See MERRYMAN, supra note 105, at 40; VON MEHIN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 104-08.
147. Const. of 1791, tit. III, ch. V, art. 22, reprinted in LES CONsTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS
1789, at 61 (Jacques Godechot ed., 1951); see also DAWSON, supra note 109, at 378.
148. See Shael Herman, From Philosophers toLegislators, andLegislabors to Gods: The French Civil
Code as Secular Scripture, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 597-98 (noting conscious decision to diminish
judiciary's power because revolutionary judges had become allies of nobility).
149. See DAWSON, supra note 109, at 380; see also EVELYNE SERVERIN, DE LA JURISPRUDENCE
EN DROrr PRrV 71-73 (1985); Paul E. Geller, Staffing the Judiciary and 'Tastes' in Justice, 61 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1849, 1859-60 (1988).
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role of judges endured. 5 ° For many years French scholars insisted that
judges only apply the law and never make it.'
Whatever the validity of this stance in 1793 or 1804, it quickly became
untenable. French courts, like courts everywhere, confronted issues that could
not be resolved by mere reference to a text. They also faced a changing
society that rendered old answers obsolete. Whether they wanted to or not,
judges had to take on a creative role. 2 However, their training and
collective memory, the popular attitude toward them, and the force of habit
led judges to retain the terse, opaque, syllogistic opinion form dating from a
time when the guillotine was a real threat to a judge who stepped out of line.
2. The Legacy of French Absolutism
Although some scholars account for the French opinion solely as a
response to Revolutionary ideas about the role of courts,' earlier develop-
ments in French political history also contributed to the form of the modern
French opinion. Before the Revolution, French opinions were even less
illuminating. They included no justifications at all, but consisted solely of a
recitation of the parties' arguments and a conclusion. 4 On the level of legal
theory, the changes wrought by the Revolution were profound, replacing a
freewheeling judiciary with a closely cabined one. In terms of the actual
practice of courts, the Revolution did nothing more than add a few clauses to
the traditional opinion.
Long ago, French kings and their lawyers devised the theory that the
crown was an absolute ruler as a part of their persistent campaign to exercise
ever greater authority against such competitors as the Pope, the Holy Roman
Emperor, and the nobles. The monarchy proclaimed that, within France, the
French king was himself the heir to the authority of the Roman Emperors.
This proposition justified denial of the authority of the Pope and the Emperor,
as well as refusal to respect feudal laws and customs. Royal lawyers
maintained that French kings, like the emperors, received their power from
God and were responsible only to God, not to the Pope or the Emperor, and
certainly not to any of their subjects."
Although this theory lacked universal acceptance even in its heyday, 56
it nonetheless forms a distinctive part of French political culture that
influenced events long after the collapse of the monarchy. For example, the
authoritarian notion that the ruler cannot be questioned by anyone may,
150. See John H. Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1865, 1865 (1988).
151. See DAwsoN, supra note 109, at 392.
152. See Merryman, supra note 150, at 1873-74.
153. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 109, at 380; Goutal, supra note 47, at 60.
154. See Sauvel, supra note 47, at 6.
155. Id. at 24; see also OLIVIER-MARTIN, supra note 138, at 329-30, 335-36.
156. See DAVID PARKER, THE MAKING OF FRENCH ABSoLUTiSM 136 (1983).
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ironically, help to explain the revolutionary view of legislative supremacy.
Napoleon could hardly have made himself emperor in a society where
authoritarianism had no currency. Both the reactionary restoration of the
monarchy after Napoleon's defeat and Louis Napoleon's 1852 coup d'6tat
overthrowing another republican government reflect the deep-rooted French
vulnerability to authoritarian rule. More recently, the willingness of many
French to accept the Pdtain regime in World War II resonates with this same
authoritarian theme. 7
This political mindset helps explain the form of French opinions. The
parlements themselves were outgrowths of the king's court."5 8 Beginning
with the parlement of Paris, they derived their authority from the king himself
and claimed the same status accorded other royal officers. The French kings
employed them, especially the parlement of Paris, as part of their struggle
against the array of competitors confronting them. Professor Dawson points
out that it was sometimes "more convenient for the French crown if some
contests that were charged with politics but conducted under judicial forms
could be settled without public discussion of the grounds for decision."' 9
Perhaps for this reason, a 1344 ordinance forbade judges of the parlement
from disclosing the reasons for decisions. 60 More important for the long
term, the parlement's historical roots in the king's court enabled it to assert
successfully that it exercised the king's authority and had no more obligation
to justify itself than he did.' 6' Proceeding from this premise, it asserted the
view that it could decide cases, "not being tied to any rule," subject only to
the king's superior authority, and adhered to this position until the Revolu-
tion.' 62
Viewed from the perspective of eight hundred years of French political
history, the French high court's response to Revolution-era notions of
legislative supremacy takes on a somewhat different character. It resembles
less a craven submission to the popular will than a subtle and somewhat
cynical stratagem to maintain and expand judicial power. Since the Revolu-
tion, the court has exercised broad power to make law, unconstrained even by
the duty to give real reasons, under cover of a positivistic legal theory that
157. See ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE 30-32 (1972); ALEXIS DE TOQUEV.LLE, THE OLD
REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 7-9 (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1955); THEODORE ZELDIN, FRANCE
1848-1945: POLTrICS AND ANGER 29-63 (1979) (discussing persistence of monarchical politics in
nineteenth-century France), 140-205 (discussing Bonapartism in nineteenth-century French politics).
158. DAWSON, supra note 109, at 273-74; OLvIER-MARTIN, supra note 138, at 537-41.
159. DAWSON, supra note 109, at 287. Early in the history of the parlements, they gave reasons for
their decisions, mainly in order to "conserve the memory of the solutions adopted." Sauvel, supra note
47, at 18. For reasons discussed in the text, the practice ceased in the fourteenth century and was not
revived until the Revolution.
160. See DAWSON, supra note 109, at 287 & n.36.
161. See J. Hilaire & C. Bloch, Connaissance des Dc'isions de Justice et Origine de la Jurispru-
dence, in JUDICIAL RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH OF CASE LAW 47, 59 (John H. Baker
ed., 1989).
162. Sauvel, supra note 47, at 24.
1994]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
even its own members sometimes admit is false. It seems to view itself as the
heir to the prerogatives of the parlement of Paris, standing above the citizens
on whose rights and duties it rules, answerable to no one. 163
The form of French judgments may be entirely a product of the Revolu-
tion, its impact on popular attitudes, and the trauma it produced among
French judges. Yet the persistence of the syllogistic opinion for two hundred
years, through vast political and social changes, suggests that something more
deeply rooted than Robespierre's positivism is at work. The authoritarian
theme in French political life, reaching back to the royal absolutism of the
Bourbon monarchs'" and reinforced by the Revolution and its aftermath,
seems to play a central role in French judges' unwillingness to part with the
traditional French opinion style. As Professor Mimin puts it, giving a more
thorough and candid account of the reasons for decisions would be "sans
prestige. "165
IV. THE UNCERTAIN VALUE OF THE REASONED OPINION
French judicial form, however grave its faults may be, provides a useful
counterpoint from which to examine the American conception of the judicial
opinion. Parts IV and V of this Article use the foregoing study of French
judicial form as a tool to explore two widely held beliefs among Americans:
(1) that the goals of teaching, persuading, constraining, and legitimating are
essential to the vitality of the legal system; and (2) that the American opinion
is an indispensable instrument for achieving those aims. 16
Part II sketched the outlines of the American reasoned opinion as a
discursive, candid essay containing inductive as well as deductive reasoning,
policy arguments as well as discussions of precedents and statutes. The
American opinion attempts to furnish guidance to people who use the law, to
persuade others that courts have reached the best solutions, and to legitimate
and constrain judicial action. The underlying assumption is that without
opinions serving these functions the legal system would operate poorly.
163. This elitist attitude is even more characteristic of the Conseil d'ttat, the high court formed in
the early nineteenth century to rule on disputes arising between individuals and the state. The French
distinguish sharply between private law and droit administratif, rules directed at the government. Over the
years, the Conseil d'Atat made a body of administrative law, with little statutory material, yet its opinions
are, if anything, less informative than those of the Cour de Cassation. See Bancaud, supra note 104, at
377.
164. See PARKER, supra note 156, at 120-26.
165. MiMiN, supra note 42, at 185.
166. The discussion here, as in Part II, takes an instrumental view of American judicial form.
Opinion writing may be justified in non-instrumental terms, on the ground that the parties are entitled to
an explanation. See supra note 11. If so, then French form fails to provide an adequate explanation in any
case where something more than deductive reasoning is required to resolve the issues. So do many
American opinions, however. See infra part V.A (on gap between ideals and reality in American opinion
writing).
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Beneath the desire for a healthy legal system lies a more basic concern.
Without reasoned opinions, it is feared, American legal institutions would lose
their effectiveness and ultimately harm the larger society. Lawyers might be
hampered in advising their clients on how to plan their activities so as to stay
within the law. Citizens might have less respect for judicial decisions if judges
were simply to hand down authoritarian pronouncements. Unconstrained
judges might take arbitrary and vindictive actions against innocent citizens.
Judges could lose all sense of the proper limits of their creative role and usurp
legislative prerogatives. Legislatures might then cabin judges so severely that
they could not maintain a body of living law.
The empirical premise of this argument cannot easily be tested within the
American legal system. No jurisdiction is likely to abandon the reasoned
opinion for curiosity's sake, especially since the predicted consequences are
so dire. Fortunately, comparative analysis furnishes an alternative to such a
risky experiment. This alternative is imperfect, because in a good experiment
everything except the variable under scrutiny is held constant, and no two
societies are alike. Still, while important differences exist between France and
the United States, they are not so great as to preclude our learning from the
French experience. By demonstrating that a radically different approach to
writing judicial opinions can thrive in a liberal democracy similar to our own,
the French opinion provides a formidable counterexample to the American
view that reasoned opinions are crucial to the proper functioning of the legal
system as a means of preserving liberty and promoting the general welfare.
A. The French Counterexample
French opinions are uninformative, authoritarian, and deceptive. French
form respects none of the values American opinions are designed to serve.
This disparity between the typical French opinion and the American model is
worthy of attention, because American theorists regard the reasoned opinion
as crucial to the success of the whole legal system. If the aims of the reasoned
opinion were prosaic or parochial, the difference between the two systems
would be no more remarkable than the divergences between the laws of New
York and California. Not much turns, for example, on whether a given legal
system employs comparative or contributory negligence, whether or not
newspapers are strictly liable for defamation, whether judges are elected or
appointed, or even, perhaps, whether rights are contained in a written
constitution or in the common law and statutes. The various approaches to
such matters have their merits, and there is plenty of room for broad
variations among healthy legal systems.
Judicial reasoning, however, is quite another matter. American theorists
like Lon Fuller and Henry Hart claimed that the reasoned opinion is critical
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to the legitimacy of the development of law by judges.167 Ronald Dworkin
thinks that "integrity," which requires reasoned decisionmaking, is a crucial
judicial virtue.168 James Boyd White holds that a legal system in which
decisions are arrived at through authoritarian dictates rather than efforts to
persuade is not "worthy of respect."169 With this in mind, one of three
conclusions seems possible: (a) the French legal system is inferior to the
American system because of the failure of French judges to employ reasoned
opinions; (b) differences between the French and American systems account
for the relatively greater importance of guidance, persuasion, legitimacy, and
constraint as goals of the American opinion; or (c) these goals are not as
important as American theorists proclaim them to be. We need not necessarily
settle on one of these explanations to the exclusion of the others. I argue that
the first is implausible, while the second and the third each account for part
of the gap between American ideals and French practice.
I reject the hypotheses that the French legal system is inferior to our own
and that the form of French judgments produces unfortunate consequences.
The ensuing paragraphs consider three criteria by which a legal system, or
aspects of a system, might be evaluated: their impact on the larger society; the
esteem in which various aspects of the system, such as judicial form, are held
by citizens and lawyers who work and live within them; and the substantive
law the system generates. Under each of these tests, the French system seems
to stand up well in comparison with our own.170
1. The Larger Society
One way to evaluate the merits of a legal system is to look for problems
in the larger society that may reflect defects in its legal institutions. For
example, virtually everyone would condemn legal regimes that do not
recognize basic human liberties or that fail to achieve an adequate level of
economic prosperity, such as those of Nazi Germany or the former Soviet
Union. Judged against such a standard, however, neither the modem French
system as a whole nor its syllogistic opinion in particular fares at all badly.
Despite centuries of cursory judicial opinions, France is a stable, mature, and
vibrant nation whose residents enjoy a high degree of personal liberty and
economic well-being. These observations may seem too obvious to require
mention, yet they bear on a central theme of this article. Since the gap
between French and American opinions is not matched by corresponding
167. See supra text accompanying notes 29 to 30.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 31 to 35.
169. WHrrE, JUsTICE AS TRAISLATION, supra note 9, at 101; see also supra text accompanying
notes 20 to 22.
170. No doubt one may advance other plausible standards for evaluating the worth of a legal system.
My intuition is that the French system will compare reasonably well with our own under any sensible set
of criteria.
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differences in the economic or political life of the two countries, critics of
French form cannot take its inferiority for granted, but must offer more
specific reasons for their criticism. One might argue that the French system
is a priori inferior because of its uninformative judicial opinions, without
regard to any manifest failures in the larger society. Unless the accusation can
be backed up with concrete examples of social dysfunction, however, the
argument seems unpersuasive; it is like arguing that a baseball team with
inexperienced or aging players is a poor one, even though it wins as often as
its supposedly superior competitors."'
2. The Views of Participants in the System
A second measure of the success of a legal system is the degree of respect
it earns from those who live and work within the system. If the charge of
inferiority were true, one would expect to see signs of dissatisfaction with the
system on the part of lawyers and citizens. French citizens are not uncritical
of their legal system, but neither are Americans entirely satisfied with their
own.' Unhappiness with the French legal system, as with the American,
is grounded in the costs and delays of litigation and irritation with lawyers.
However, no stronger connection exists between French frustration with
courts and mistrust of lawyers on the one hand, and the particular features of
French judicial form on the other, than exists between popular dislike of
lawyers and courts in America and the form of American opinions.
French lawyers, who must use opinions in advising clients, grumble about
the absence of reasons in French opinions, but their complaints seem no more
severe than those of American lawyers who dislike the multiplicity of reasons
in American opinions and the ambiguity that results. In her role as an
advocate, the French lawyer manages to use the terse opinions in her dossier
despite the absence of reasons, simply by ascribing to the court the reasons
that support her client's position and rationalizing or minimizing the
importance of cases that do not fit her thesis.' Is her solution very differ-
ent from that of the American lawyer who invents a theory to explain away
judicial language that does not support her cause? Many American lawyers
would admit that, apart from the guidance they may provide, the reasons in
171. Notice, however, that if the parties are entitled to an explanation as a matter of right, the
absence of bad consequences does not save the French opinion from condemnation for failure to provide
them with one. See supra notes 11 & 166.
172. See, e.g., Tan Thi Thanh Trai Le, The French Legal Profession: A Prisoner of Its Glorious
Past?, 15 Comell Int'l L. J. 63, 63 (1982) (reporting that 1978 survey showed that less than five percent
of French held positive view of the avocat).
173. Cf. CMMSTIAN ATIAS, EPiSTEMLoM JORIDiQUE 134-35 (1984) ("[If a lawyer] wants to win
the case, he must not content himself with enumerating references, nor even citing the principal extracts
of decisions. In particular, he must analyze the contrary decisions to show either that their reasoning is
irrelevant to the case at hand, or that their reasoning leads to results much less satisfying, much less just,
than those produced by the decisions favorable to his cause.").
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opinions serve largely as a sort of stockpile of weapons to be deployed as the
occasion requires. In their absence, however, lawyers would surely find other
forms of weaponry, as they do in France.
In the past thirty years, some objections to the French opinion form have
arisen, and have received the attention of French judges. One concern voiced
was that opinions should be more comprehensible to lawyers, and especially
litigants. Such complaints focused on the lower tiers of the system, where the
opinion contains an elaborate discussion of the facts. As a result of these
complaints, the exorde, which sets forth the facts and claims of the parties, is
now written in narrative form in many lower courts. 74 However, French
lawyers opposed a proposal to extend the narrative form to the more important
part of the opinion - the motifs setting forth the reasons for the result - for
fear that the reasoning would become insufficiently rigorous if the syllogism
were abandoned." Despite Touffait and Tunc's proposal for more sweeping
changes,176 the reform movement never influenced the three highest courts,
the Cour de Cassation, the Conseil d'ttat, and the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel.'n
3. The Substantive Law Generated By the System
Third, legal systems might be evaluated in terms of the content of the
substantive law they produce. While French and American law differ
considerably at the conceptual level, there is often a notable convergence of
practical result.17 1 Where differences exist, Americans who study the French
system frequently conclude that it works at least as well as our own.
179
The French case law system sometimes produces a body of doctrine that
is incoherent and unworkable, as illustrated by the rule of strict liability
articulated in Jand'heur. French courts have never arrived at a satisfactory
174. See EsToUP, supra note 49, at 13-14; SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 27.
175. See SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 53-55.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 113 to 116.
177. See, e.g., SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 63-64 (arguing that French judges, unlike Anglo-
American judges, merely apply the law to the facts); see also Tunc, Methodology, supra note 105, at 467
("Unfortunately, the suggestion has thus far met more skepticism or opposition than enthusiasm.").
178. See, e.g., 1 LAWSON & MARKEsINIs, supra note 43, at 180; Baguenault de Puchesse, supra
note 108, at 133-34; Edward A. Tomlinson, Performance Obligations of the Aggrieved Contractant: The
French Experience, 12 LOY. L.A. INT'L. & CoMP. L.J. 139, 141, 213-15 (1989).
179. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American LawReform:
How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542
(1990) (arguing that French criminal processes are better than our own in important ways); Burt Neuborne,
Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 377-
410 (1982) (arguing that French judiciary effectively employs separation of powers review to enforce
substantive values); Vernon V. Palmer, A Comparative Study (From a Common Law Perspective) of the
French Action for Wrong/d Interference with Contract, 40 AM. J. COMp. L. 297, 302 (1992); Arthur T.
von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Fxercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L.
REv. 1009, 1074-78 (1959) (arguing that French and German law techniques for determining when a
promise is enforceable are preferable to common law concept of consideration); cf. BROWN & GARNER,
supra note 110, at 172-81 (evaluating French administrative law and finding it not inferior to English law).
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delineation of the circumstances in which this rule should apply. As noted
earlier, Touffait and Tunc argue that the form of the French opinion is at least
partly to blame for the failure."'0 Perhaps reasoned opinions would have
resulted in a more satisfactory doctrine.
Yet American courts also have struggled with the concept of liability
without fault in tort. No one would argue that American products liability law
is particularly coherent.181 An equally plausible explanation for problems in
the judicial development of Article 1384 of the French Civil Code would
focus not on the form of the French opinion but rather on the inherent
difficulty of organizing a liability scheme around the concept of strict
liability.1" More generally, the strict liability example suggests that Ameri-
can lawyers are in a poor position to argue that reasoned opinions necessarily
lead to more coherent bodies of law. As anyone familiar with American law
can attest, despite the regime of reasoned opinions, products liability is only
one of many areas in which incoherence is an endemic problem.
B. Is the Comparison Apt?
If it is true that France has not suffered unduly from the form of its
judicial opinions, then either the American system is more dependent upon
guidance, persuasion, constraint, and legitimacy in judicial opinions than is
the French system, or else those goals do not deserve the fundamental status
American theorists accord them. Unlike Americans, the French do not require
that the guidance function be carried out within judicial opinions themselves.
French lawyers have found other means of learning what the law is and what
judicial decisions signify. After the lawyers have submitted their arguments
in a case, it is turned over to an officer called a conseiller-rapporteur, who
prepares a report analyzing the issues in the case. In many cases a
government officer called an avocat-generale prepares a memorandum
containing a balanced analysis of the issues, including considerations of
economic and social policy, and a proposed resolution of the case. This
document roughly resembles an amicus brief by the Solicitor General in
180. See supra text accompanying notes 113 to 116.
181. Indeed, in recent years courts have begun to move away from strict liability in many areas of
products law. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study in Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 479, 480 (1990) (identifying "a
significant turn in the direction ofludicial decisionmaking away from extending the boundaries of products
liability and toward placing significant limitations on plaintiffs' rights to recover in tort for product-related
injuries").
182. See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURIsPRuDENCE, supra note 24, at 323-28; Gary T. Schwartz,
The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 977-1005 (1981); Ernest
J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CH.-KENT L. REV. 407, 416-29 (1987).
183. See DAWSON, supra note 109, at 321-23, 402-03. For the rapporteur's memorandum (in
French) in Jand'heur, see 2 LAWSON & MARXESINIS, supra note 43, at 252-71. An English translation
of part of it may be found in VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 629-31.
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American practice. It often illuminates the court's decision, even when the
result is contrary to the recommendation."14
After an important case is decided, a law professor, lawyer, or even a
judge always writes an analysis, similar to an American case comment,
describing the doctrinal background and implications of the holding. I"
Sometimes these articles even serve as surrogates for concurring or dissenting
opinions, revealing hidden tensions on the Court.'86 Apart from case notes,
French law professors spend much more of their professional lives writing
about judicial developments than do American professors at prominent law
schools.' 87 The treatise remains a highly reputable form of scholarship in
France, providing a means for lawyers to learn about case law developments
in their larger context. The educati6nal function served by discursive
American opinions is thus accomplished in France by means entirely outside
the opinion-writing process.
The asserted moral or legal obligation to give reasons rests on the
perceived danger of judicial arbitrariness, abuse, or overreaching. This
concern is quite general across all legal systems (except perhaps those of
totalitarian states) and is at least as important a value in France as it is in
America. The need to keep judges in line is most critical with regard to lower
court judges, who may act as petty tyrants in the absence of oversight. Here
also, the French seem to succeed tolerably well, despite the absence of
reasoned opinions. Other features of the legal system, in particular the judicial
selection process and its emphasis on strictly professional qualifications rather
than political litmus tests, probably provide adequate safeguards against
judicial abuse of power in France,' just as the report of the avocat-
generale and doctrinal scholarship serve as a sort of surrogate for the
guidance function of opinions.
When the focus shifts from guidance and constraint to the persuasive and
legitimating role of opinions, the gap between American and French practice
is far harder to explain as merely a difference in the means employed toward
achieving the same end. Persuasion and legitimacy are not aims that may be
fully realized in the absence of reasoned opinions. Law professors and others
may offer persuasive justifications for results reached by courts, criticize
decisions they regard as unwise, and show how novel outcomes are consistent
184. VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 145; JoBARD-BACHELLIER & BACHELLIER, supra
note 100, at 41.
185. See DAWSON, supra note 109, at 398-99; Touffait & Tune, supra note 113, at 489. These
casenotes are published in collections of French cases. See, e.g., CAPrrANT, supra note 43.
Although French opinions are rather opaque, even the newspapers sometimes offer interpretative
analyses of them. See, e.g., Jacques de Saint-Victor, Graves: la Cour de Cassation Prcise le Pouvoir des
Juges, LE FIGARO, July 2, 1992, at 35 (discussing new case law on strikes that chambre social of Cour
de Cassation has begun to establish gradually since 1988).
186. See, e.g., Touffait & Tune, supra note 113, at 495-96.
187. For a discussion of the work of French law professors, see Tune, Methodology, supra note
supra note 105, at 468-72.
188. See Bell, supra note 96, at 1778; Geller, supra note 149, at 1861.
[Vol. 19: 81
French and American Judicial Opinions
with or compelled by existing principles. 89 While their work is useful to the
effective functioning of the system, American theorists do not regard it as a
satisfactory substitute for explanations from the judges themselves. The
persuasive and legitimating aims of the reasoned opinion require that the
decisionmakers themselves offer good reasons when they wield governmental
power. James Boyd White insists, for example, that in order to deserve
respect, judges must offer convincing justifications for their holdings, not
hand down authoritarian decrees. 9 ' Similarly, legitimacy is a problem
because judges sometimes act inventively. Theorists like Lon Fuller and
Ronald Dworldn view it as a responsibility of the court to demonstrate in its
opinion that such creativity is not based on personal preference but is bounded
by reason.191
Are the French and American systems sufficiently different that the goals
of persuasion and legitimacy take on less importance in France than in
America? Although three differences between the French and American
systems suggest that they may be, I believe these differences to be insufficient
to explain the radical variation in approaches to opinion writing in the two
systems.
1. Formal and Substantive Reasoning
One characteristic of the French system that may explain its lesser
emphasis upon persuasion and legitimacy is its focus upon "formal" reasoning.
In other words, French judges stress the importance of following existing
rules, while American adjudication emphasizes the choice and implementation
of substantive values and policy. 192 Thus, the argument runs, it is less
important that opinions explain results in France, since the result often turns
on an established rule that can be applied in a straightforward way to the
facts.193 In America, where rules are few and substantive concerns dominate
189. See ATIAS, supra note 173, at 57, 59, 83-86, 127.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 20 to 22.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 29 to 36.
192. For example, in torts cases a judge may instruct the jury to weigh the costs and benefits of
untaken precautions, or to decide whether the defendant was blameworthy. Alternatively, she may tell the
jurors that the violation of a statute amounts to negligence as a matter of law. The former instructions call
for substantive inquiries by the jury. The latter compels an outcome if a statutory violation is found,
without regard to any moral, utilitarian, or other substantive inquiry.
For a general discussion of this distinction, see ATIYAI & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 5-31. To
summarize, "[a] substantive reason may be defined as a moral, economic, political, institutional, or other
social consideration." Id. at 5. "Formal reasons are different in that they frequently do not bring
substantive reasons directly into play.... A rule, for instance, may incorporate substantive reasons and
yet operate as an independent reason for action even when the substantive reasons do not apply, or even
when those reasons may point to a contrary conclusion." Id. at 7; see also Robert S. Summers, Judge
Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1302 (1991) (book review).
193. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 112-18 (1991) (arguing that a rule is itself
justification for action, quite independent of reasons behind it); see also AT1YAH & SUMiERS, supra note
2, at 7; Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 537 (1988).
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judicial decisionmaking, this alternative is less often available. It is therefore
more often crucial that the judge explain the outcome, since our predilection
for substantive reasoning precludes the alternative of simply relying upon a
rule.
194
Since American adjudication is so substantive in its orientation, 95 this
argument for a difference between the two systems is not entirely without
force. One would be hard-pressed to find any other legal system where
persuasion and legitimacy are quite so necessary as they are in the United
States. The problem with the argument is that, despite the formal fagade of
the French opinion, French law is not particularly formal. 19 While it is
more rule-oriented than our system, the notion that French judges merely
deduce results from the Civil Code is a wildly inaccurate caricature of their
actual practice. 197 As noted earlier, judicial invention is a routine feature of
the French system, and the Code is heavily glossed by judicial decisions. In
fact, French administrative law, which governs relations between the citizen
and the state, is not based on a code but is made out of whole cloth by the
judges of the Conseil d'ttat, much like any area of Anglo-American common
law.
9 8
Although French courts do not avow substantive considerations, they
routinely take them into account in reaching their decisions.' 99 When the
Code yields an answer they do not like, they often find a way around it.2oc
In order to achieve the results they desire, they resort to "a somewhat forced
interpretation of legislative texts,"21' and employ such "supereminent
principles" as "fraud spoils everything," "abuse of right," and "unjust
enrichment, "2'2 even when the effect of doing so is to supersede legisla-
194. Cf. Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, In
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461, 502-06 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETINa STATUTES] (explaining differences in French and
American judicial form largely as implications of contrast between French positivism and American
instrumentalism).
195. See generally ATYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2.
196. One eminent French scholar argues against rigid formal restraints thus:
The law is not an end in itself; it serves the conception that we have of our social life and of
justice. An attachment to formalism must not lead us to sacrifice the means to the end. The
strictness of the law must be relaxed if its strict application violates what we believe justice
requires. The appeal to general legal principles by the administrative courts and the use of
concepts such as equity, public order, and good morals by the regular courts are required by
our very conception of law. The use of these general principles and broad concepts is based
in itself on an awareness that positive law is not an end in itself and is not sufficient to accom-
plish the final goal of the legal system -justice."
David, supra note 105, at 132.
197. See, e.g., DAWsoN, supra note 109, at 400-01; 2 LAWsON & MARKESINIS, supra note 43, at
43-67; Bancaud, supra note 104, at 373; Tunc, Logique et Politique, supra note 105, at 317-39.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 110 to 111.
199. See, e.g., SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 85-124. For some examples, mainly from tort law,
see 2 LAWSON & MARKEsum, supra note 43, at 45, 50-51, 54, 60-61, 63, 68-69, 153, 156.
200. See Michel Troper et al., Statutory Interpretation in France, in INTERPRET NG STATUTEs, supra
note 194, at 171-73, 189-90.
201. David, supra note 105, at 120; see also Troper et al., supra note 200, at 177-78.
202. See David, supra note 105, at 121-26.
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tion.2 3 In addition, French judges have at their disposal a number of open-
ended code provisions that give them broad discretion to pursue their notions
of good policy.' 4 Andr6 Tune, a scholar of French, English, and American
law, suggests that French law may be more formal in its treatment of
precedent than American law but less so than English law.205 The French
practice of deciding cases on narrow grounds helps French courts maintain
flexibility to decide future cases, without constraint from prior decisions. 2°s
Consequently, while American adjudication may be more substantive than
French, this difference alone does not seem sharp enough to justify the wide
gap between French and American opinion-writing styles.
2. The Role of Courts in Society
The second difference concerns the role of courts in society. American
courts are far more prominent in addressing the pressing needs of society than
are French courts. American courts strike down legislation on constitutional
grounds, 7 hear sweeping challenges to government practices, order the
reform of school systems, 2°' prisons, 201 and other institutions, 210  and
manage the implementation of broad decrees.2" This sort of "public law"
litigation has been virtually unknown in France since the Revolution. Ordinary
203. Id. at 132.
204. Id. at 120, 122, 123-24, 127-28.
205. See Tune, Methodology, supra note 105, at 465 (suggesting that in most fields of law, authority
of a precedent of Court of Cassation is less than that of an English precedent and greater than that of an
American precedent). F.H. Lawson, a distinguished English comparativist, evidently shared Tune's view.
See F.H. Lawson, Comparative Judicial Style, 25 AM. J. CoMI,. L. 364, 370 (1977). On the Anglo-
American comparison, see also ATiYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 118-27 (arguing that precedent
carries more weight in English courts than in American courts).
Professor Nicholas attributes the looser French approach to precedent to the French view that judicial
decisions have no official status as law. BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 14-15 (1982);
see Jean Carbonnier, Authorities in CivilLaw: France, in JUDICIAL DECISIONS, supra note 105, at 91, 95-
97. However, in America, where judicial decisions do have official status as law, attitudes toward
precedent are even more relaxed than in France. The differences between the three systems are better
captured in terms of the varying weight each gives to formal and substantive values in legal reasoning. See
ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra, at 429 ('Legal systems may be compared in terms of their relative reliance
on formal reasoning .. ").
206. See 2 LAWSON & MARKESINS, supra note 43, at 183; Bancaud, supra note 104, at 376 (noting
that Cour de Cassation is criticized not only "for unveiling nothing of its real motivations" and "being
mistaken on the nature of the social rapport that the law had to translate," but also for "taking decisions
dictated by the circumstances of each affair and not by a generalizable vision').
207. E.g., Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (striking
down section of federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
208. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (ordering busing to
achieve racial integration of public schools).
209. E.g., United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991) (ordering state to reform its
prisons).
210. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholdt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (ordering reform of mental hospitals).
211. E.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (enjoining police harassment in a wide-ranging
decree); see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Rv. 1281
(1976).
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French courts cannot even consider the constitutional validity of legislation.
Only the Conseil Constitutionnel, a quasi-judicial body formed after World
War H, can entertain such challenges.212 Perhaps it is more important to
give a reasoned explanation for judicial actions in a system like our own,
where courts take on a large role in overseeing other parts of the government
and reforming large institutions, than it is in France, where the judicial role
is more limited.2"
The more significance given a decision, the more important it is to
justify it with a reasoned opinion so as to win its acceptance by those affected
by the ruling.214 When a case touches the interests of many people, public
acceptance is all the more critical. Surely constitutional litigation falls into this
category.2 15 Two problems make this explanation for the difference between
French and American practice less persuasive. First, French judges do not
recognize a distinction between constitutional and ordinary litigation that
would require different opinion models for each. The Conseil Constitutionnel
follows the traditional deductive opinion form.216 Second, American
partisans of the persuasive opinion do not limit their concern to constitutional
or other "systemic" litigation. They argue instead that persuasion and
legitimacy are needed across the board, and their view is reflected in the
ordinary practices of American courts. American opinions on common law
and statutory topics, no less than on constitutional issues, are framed as
reasoned efforts to persuade.
3. Civil Law and Common Law
A third difference between the two systems must be addressed because of
its prominence, though it seems to have little bearing on the issue of judicial
form. This is the distinction between common law countries, whose traditions
come from England, and civil law countries, whose legal institutions
originated in Rome.217 These differences are "especially marked in the
general structure of the systems, in the classifications and rules of what is
traditionally private law, having to do with persons, property, succession, and
212. The organization, composition, history, and jurisdiction of this tribunal are discussed in James
E. Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 189; James E. Beardsley, The
Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in France, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 431 (1972).
213. See Summers & Taruffo, supra note 194, at 503-04.
214. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Comer of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1717-19
(1988) (contrasting America, and its emphasis on appellate opinions and constitutional adjudication, with
other jurisprudential cultures where these are less important).
215. See Nagel, supra note 10, at 170-71.
216. For a collection of decisions by this tribunal, see Louis FAvOREU & LoIc PHILIP, L.S
GRANDEs DtCiSIONs DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (5th ed. 1989). In recent years, constitutional
decisions, while retaining their traditional deductive structure, have grown longer.
217. See ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CVIL LAW 3-4 (1981).
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obligations, and in the law of procedure and rules of evidence."2 1 The
formal structure of French decisions can itself be traced to Roman law.219
Even so, an effort to maintain that French form is an ineluctable product
of the civil law tradition would fall short, if only because many important civil
law jurisdictions, including Germany and Italy, reject French form.' More
important, even if all civil law countries followed the French model, the
distinction between civil law and common law could hardly account for the
divergence between French and American opinions. An adequate explanation
must focus on the functions served by American opinions and show that those
functions are not important in France or are otherwise met. Yet the role of
judges in ordinary litigation does not differ significantly in France and
America."1 Whatever their force, the arguments for the reasoned opinion
as a means for providing guidance, persuading others, and constraining and
legitimating judicial action, draw their strength from the vital role of courts
in a complex legal system. The conceptual differences between civil and
common law systems are irrelevant to these goals.
Comparative analysis enables us to entertain ideas that otherwise may
seem absurd.' Although differences between the American and French
systems may account for some of the gaps between French practice and
American ideals in opinion writing, they cannot completely explain that gap.
Given this, it seems that either Americans err in supposing that persuasion and
legitimacy are essential goals in common law and statutory contexts, or else
218. Ald at 1.
219. See supra note 47.
220. See RENA DAVID & JOHN E.C. BiJERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYsTEms IN THE WORLD TODAY 142
(3d ed. 1985) (reporting that French form, or something like it, "is followed in Belgium, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the Nordic countries with the exception of Sweden... [but not in]
Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Sweden." See also FOLKE SCHMIDT, THE RATIO DECIDENDI:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF A FRENCH, A GERMAN AND AN AMERICAN SUPREME COURT DECISION
(1965); J. Grus WETTER, THE STYLES OF APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A CASE STUDY IN
CoMPARATIVE LAW (1960). German judicial form is more structured than the Anglo-American style, but
less so than the French. For a discussion of the differences between Anglo-American and German judicial
form, see B. MARKESInIS, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 6-10 (2d ed. 1990); B. Markesinis,
Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Common Lawyer Looks at Some Judgments of the German
Federal Court, 34 AM. J. CoNM. L. 349, 349-54 (1986); see also John P. Dawson, Book Review, 49 U.
Cm. L. REv. 595, 599-600 (1982).
221. See MERRYMAN, supra note 105, at 80-84; 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOT, EfNFHRUNG
IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHNUNG [AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw] 278-80 (2d ed. 1987)
(concluding that "there are ... grounds for believing that although the Common Law and the Civil Law
started off from opposite positions, they are gradually moving closer together even in their legal methods
and techniques"); Summers & Taruffo, supra note 194, at 508 (concluding comparative study of statutory
interpretation with observation that "much of what we believe we have found does not justify the
traditional emphasis on this distinction [between civil law and common law systems], as applied to the
subject of statutory interpretation"). One important difference is the use of juries in civil litigation in the
United States. This is not a civil law/common law distinction, as the jury has also been largely abolished
in many common law jurisdictions outside the United States. See, e.g., ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note
2, at 169-70. If anything, this difference suggests a greater need for accountability on the part of French
judges, since they have more power than American judges.
222. Cf. BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 7, at 108 (observing that "an alternative symbolic
universe poses a threat because its very existence demonstrates empirically that one's own universe is less
than inevitable').
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the French system is illegitimate and unworthy of its citizens' respect. Since
the French system seems to survive well enough and to enjoy as much respect
from the French people as Americans accord our legal institutions, we should
take seriously the possibility that the American preoccupation with persuasion
and legitimacy is misplaced. The French comparison teaches us that a legal
system can function adequately without caring much about either of these
supposedly fundamental goals.
V. QUESTIONING THE INSTRUMENTAL MODEL
Part II demonstrated that Americans conceive of the judicial opinion in
instrumental terms. They consider guidance, persuasion, constraint, and
legitimacy to be indispensable functions of an opinion and evaluate opinions
in terms of their success in achieving these ends. Part III contrasted this
instrumental view with that prevailing in France, where written opinions seem
little concerned with such matters. Part IV questioned the necessity of
persuasion and legitimacy for a viable legal system, but accepted the premise
that the American opinion is an instrument well suited to achieving these
instrumental goals.
This Part returns to that premise. Whatever the normative value of
guidance, persuasion, constraint, and legitimacy, it may be inaccurate to
describe most American opinions as genuine efforts to pursue them. The
instrumental view of American opinions may not adequately describe reality.
A more satisfactory account of the American approach to judicial opinion
crafting is that this form is, in large measure, a manifestation of our legal
history and culture, just as the style of French opinions is a product of the
peculiarities of French legal and political history.
The argument against the instrumental model rests on two premises drawn
from our study of French form. First, if I am right to doubt the indispensable
character of the reasoned opinion, then one of the pillars of the instrumental
view collapses. If a legal system can get along well enough without reasoned
opinions, as France seems to do, then it becomes much more difficult to insist
that we would necessarily face disaster without our present instrumental form.
Second, becoming familiar with the French opinion may alter, in subtle
but significant ways, our perception of the very nature of judicial opinions.
As long as lawyers, judges, and academics operate within the received
wisdom of conventional legal practice, they will seldom have occasion to
question the instrumental interpretation of the American opinion.I As a
223. The issue is raised in our legal literature only by scholars who come to legal issues from the
perspective of another discipline, like the free market economists, who claim that the real reasons for
decisions are not to be found in opinions but in the demands of economic efficiency, see, e.g., RIcHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21 (3d ed. 1986), or a variety of scholarly traditions on the
left, such as the Marxist view that legal rules reflect the "hegemony" of the established order, see, e.g.,
Edward Greer, Antonio Gramsci and 'Legal Hegemony, ' in THE PolTIcs OF LAW 304-09 (D. Kairys ed.,
[Vol. 19: 81
French and American Judicial Opinions
result, it is all too easy to confuse the familiar with the necessary and to
assume that the instrumental conception of opinions is an inevitable one, since
it has no competitors within our practice. Yet the alternative illustrated by the
French opinion shows that the instrumental view is not the only plausible one.
The French opinion cannot be explained in instrumental terms, since it fails
to fulfill or even to pursue the aims we expect opinions to achieve.
Encountering French form broadens our perspective and enables us to
conceive of opinions as something other than instruments. The example it
offers permits us to question whether the instrumental model is the most
appropriate one for American practice, though it hardly compels us to change
our minds. If the American attachment to the reasoned opinion is based on a
careful judgment that opinions should serve as instruments of guidance,
persuasion, constraint, and legitimacy, then the persistence of a thriving
alternative in France may do little to shake our view of what an opinion is and
what it should contain. However, to the extent that our view is merely 'the
product of constant exposure to a particular form of opinion that claims to
achieve such goals, then encountering a different way of doing things should
encourage us to take a hard look at the validity of the instrumental model.
A. The Gap Between Ideal Opinions and Typical Opinions
Once we strip the instrumental model of the false necessity our internal
perspective attributes to it, it becomes apparent that this model does not, in
fact, describe most American judicial opinions. American ideas about the
nature of judicial opinions are based, at least in part, on a confusion between
the best opinions (as measured by the instrumental model) and the majority.
The very finest opinions, by judges like Brandeis, Cardozo, Friendly, Harlan,
Holmes, Jackson, and Traynor, to name some of the more outstanding
examples, do provide guidance and teaching, offer persuasive rhetoric, and
present carefully reasoned arguments that demonstrate more or less success-
fully that the author of the opinion is applying the law and not merely doing
as he pleases.
Many American opinions fall far short of the standard these judges set.
They are too poorly crafted to persuade doubters or provide much guidance
to lawyers and lower courts. "Too many of our judicial opinions contain
unexamined assumptions, conventional and perhaps shallow pieties, and
confident assertions bottomed on prejudice and folklore. " 4 The reasoning,
and any persuasive force it may have, gets lost in a sea of citations, technical
jargon, and euphemisms.' If French opinions give too few reasons,
1982). See also Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
224. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 24, at 97.
225. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 108; see also Nagel, supra note 10, at 192-95.
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American opinions often give too many. They provide little guidance because
the court leaves unclear just which reasons are crucial to the outcome. 2
6
As for the role of reasons in conferring legitimacy on judicial actions,
opinions often conceal, rather than explain and justify, new developments in
the law.' For example, many courts employ the technique of reasoning by
analogy, which may divert attention from the policy choices that ought to
govern the decision of whether to treat a new problem under an established
rubric?.2 Other judges ostensibly rely on precedent, but this is a dubious
source of justification because prior case law frequently turns out to be
equivocal and contradictory 219 The lack of candor found in many opinions
exacerbates all of these problems."
For all the faults of the American opinion, the obligation to give reasons
may still constrain lower court judges from arbitrary actions in some cases.
As one scholar notes, however, "most judicial decisions in courts of first
instance in the United States are not written, and there is no attempt at
justifying them in a systematic and public way.""1 Safeguards against abuse
of their power must come, as in France, through careful judicial selection and
oversight by higher courts.
The problems persist over time and across a wide range of judicial
philosophies. The U.S. Supreme Court furnishes a convenient illustration."i
In the 1950s and 1960s, critics assailed the Warren Court not only for its
substantive rulings, but also for failures of craftsmanship. 23 Nor are such
problems linked solely to liberal activism. In the 1930s, commentators
challenged not only the merits of decisions by the conservative Court striking
down New Deal legislation, but also the competence of its opinions." 3 More
226. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 231-32; see also Abner J. Mikva, For Whom
Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (1988).
227. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 24, at 92-93. See generally LON L.
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
228. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 24, at 93.
229. Id. at 94.
230. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 107-09, 205; see also Alan M. Dershowitz
& John H. Ely, Harris v. New York. Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971); Louis M. Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (1988). The problem of lack of candor is not limited to unscrupulous
judges. It may be endemic to the process of opinion writing. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 56 ('Only
by happenstance will an opinion accurately report the process of deciding.").
231. Ruth Gavison, The Good Judge, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1624 (1988); see also Judith
Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987).
232. See Herbert Hovencamp, The Supreme Court as Constitutional Interpreter: Chronology Without
History, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1384, 1386 (1992) (reviewing DAVID CURRIE, THE CONsTrrUTION IN THE
SUPRErME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986 (1990)).
233. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957); Hart, ime Charts, supra note 12 at
100-24 (1959); Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: 'Equal in Origin and Equal in 7thle to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145 (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
234. See, e.g., Charles S. Collier, Judicial Bootstraps and the General Welfare Clause, 4 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 211 (1936); see also White, Evolution, supra note 6, at 283-84.
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recently, critics have charged that the Court under Chief Justices Burger and
Rehnquist has displayed a lack of candor 5 and disrespect for prec-
edent." 6 It has made arbitrary distinctions, 7 and has handed down ad
hoc, unprincipled decisions." The current Court's dismantling of the
federal habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners is as fine an example of
unrestrained judicial activism and lack of candor as anything the Warren
Court ever did. 9
For Touffait and Tune, the American style of judicial opinion is far
superior, because it provides better guidance, permits informed criticism of
decisions, ensures greater participation in the legal process, facilitates the
effort to focus upon social reality in reaching decisions, and ultimately
produces better substantive results.2" If they are right, French form is so
uninformative that virtually any move to a more fully explanatory opinion
would be an improvement. Even so, Touffait and Tune, as well as other
admirers of American form, would do well to recognize the gap between the
ideal opinion and the far less appealing reality. Many, if not most, American
opinions, even those of the U.S. Supreme Court, do not achieve the goals to
which American judges ostensibly aspire. If the instrumental conception of the
American opinion is not entirely false, neither is it an accurate depiction of
most judicial output.
Even though the goals served by opinions are often betrayed in practice,
Americans hold to the instrumental model, never considering that the model
itself may be descriptively deficient. Perhaps Americans' allegiance to it is
strictly normative, and explicable wholly in terms of devotion to the values
that opinions are said to serve. It seems likely, however, that one reason for
our fidelity to the instrumental model is the absence from our discourse of any
alternative. So long as the instrumental model is the only one available, our
tendency will be to characterize the many gaps between the ideal and the
reality merely as regrettable failures. Becoming familiar with the radically
different French opinion enables an American to entertain the possibility that
the problem may lie in his attachment to the instrumental model as a
necessary description of the judicial opinion. However desirable the reasoned
opinion might be as a normative goal, if American judges depart from it often
235. See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 230, at 1199; Henry P. Monaghan, Of 'Liberty' and
'Property, '62 CoRNELL L. REV. 405, 424 (1977); Shapiro, supra note 8, at 741-42; Geoffrey R. Stone,
The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 169.
236. See Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980
Wis. L. REV. 467; Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 742-43 (1988) (citing Garcia v. SAMTA, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), as proof that Rehnquist Court
has little respect for its own precedent).
237. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1436, 1441 (1987); Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 230, at 1199.
238. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REv. 315, 326-27 (1984)
(book review).
239. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HATi rs L. J. 939, 1028-46 (1991).
240. Touffait & Tune, supra note 113, at 502-04.
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and seriously enough, we might do well to consider different approaches more
in keeping with what judges actually do.
B. Legal Culture and Judicial Form
Aside from the gap between the ideal American opinion and those that are
most often written, the close resemblance between American and British
judicial form also casts doubt on the explanatory power of the instrumental
model. The need for opinions to advance the goals of persuasion and
legitimacy is weaker in Britain than in America, because British law is more
rule oriented and precedent bound, and therefore less freewheeling and
substantive in its focus than our own. 41 One observer familiar with all three
systems, for example, maintains that British law is actually more rule oriented
than French law.242 To the extent that the importance of reason in the
American opinion turns on the special role of courts in American society as
agents of social reform and checks on the other branches of government, those
grounds are as absent in Britain as they are in France. Yet reasoning is at
least as prominent in the British opinion as in the American. 24 Here, then,
is another reason to suspect that functional considerations are not the sole -
and perhaps not even the most important - explanatory factors behind the
reasoned opinion.
If French form is a product of French legal and political history,2' we
should consider the possibility that the more reasoned Anglo-American
opinion can be explained in similar terms: as a cultural artifact rather than as
an instrument necessary for the pursuit of vital normative goals. The historical
themes that contributed to the nature of French opinions can be contrasted to
parallel developments in the Anglo-American legal and political tradition.
Other cultural differences may also play a part in accounting for the
divergences between French and American form.
1. The Judge in Anglo-American Legal History
In the seventeenth century, English kings, no less than the French
Bourbons, asserted a divine right of absolute rule.24 England differed from
France, however, in that the English Parliament was a comparatively
241. See generally ATIYAH & SummERS, supra note 2.
242. See Tune, Methodology, supra note 105, at 465.
243. For accounts of British judicial style, see Rudden, supra note 72, at 1013-21 (noting that
English style "accepts the need to meet and rebut argument... [and] is candid as to the options open');
Goutal, supra note 47, at 46-51 (noting that "the English opinion ... is a discursive process, incidentally
integrating various forms of reasoning").
244. See supra part II.C.
245. See generally JOHN H. MILLER, BOURBON AND STUART: KINGS AND KINGSHIP IN FRANCE AND
ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1987).
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representative body, although only property owners could vote or serve in
it.2" While the French parlements sought to share the king's absolutist
mantle, English judges took a radically different stance. In the power struggle
between the king and Parliament, the common law courts repudiated the
crown's absolutist claims. They asserted that the king himself was subject to
the common law and that the common law drew its authority from reason
rather than from naked governmental power.247 Eventually, Parliament and
the common law judges and lawyers prevailed.24
Eighteenth century American lawyers, in their struggle with the English
king and Parliament for political control in the American colonies, viewed
themselves as the successors of Sir Edward Coke and other seventeenth-
century English lawyers and judges. The Americans felt themselves to be
standing up for the rights of Englishmen won a century earlier by Parliament
and the English courts.249 They, too, relied on their understanding of the
common law as a source for their claims, and conceived of government as
being subject to the law rather than above it. Significantly, this applied to
judges as well as parliamentarians and kings. Thus, the position taken by the
parlement of Paris, that judges could wield power as they pleased without
justifying their actions, was alien to the American conception of government
from the very beginning.
English and American judges, like their French counterparts, experienced
radical changes in government. Unlike the French parlementaires, however,
English and American judges were on the winning side of their nations' great
political conflagrations. Unlike French judges, they were admired as bulwarks
246. The political structures of the two countries began to grow apart much earlier. Because England
was a smaller country, because the barons (after the Conquest) were few in number and owed their
positions to the king, and because the ruling class was a small group of foreigners allied against a hostile
populace, that ruling class early on conceived of England as a country and themselves as "the community
of the entire country." By contrast, French kings tried to assert dominion over a vast territory whose
nobles had little in common and owed the king nothing. In these circumstances English nobles gravitated
toward participation in the government of the nation while French nobles resisted it. French kings had to
assert absolute power in order to rule at all. It was easier for English kings to rule effectively without
making claims to absolute power. The historical roots of the divergence between French and English
political structure are summarized in CHARLEs T. WOOD, JOAN OF ARc AND RICHARD III, at 3-9 (1988).
Professor Wood does not challenge these views, but he does complain that they "reflect neither the
concerns that most animated medieval people nor the context within which they viewed their world." Il
at 9. In the ensuing essays that make up the body of his book, he stresses varying attitudes toward the
nature of kingship in the two countries, and traces many of these differences to the extraordinary ability
of French kings reliably to produce male heirs from 987 to 1498, with just one gap of twelve years (1316-
28). For this reason, he argues, it was comparatively easy for French kings to justify their status in
religious terms and to avoid sharing governmental power with anyone outside the royal family. By
contrast, English kings often had no such claim to genealogical legitimacy. Circumstances forced them to
seek approval and participation from Parliament and others in times of crisis. See id. at 22-28, 43, 114,
119-24, 145-46.
247. See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRsT PART OF THE INSTITUTEs OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND,
97b (Garland Publishing 1979) (1628) (maintaining that "reason is the life of the law, nay the common
law itselfe is nothing else but reason").
248. See MICHAEL LANDON, THE TRUMNPH OF THE LAWYERs 25 (1970).
249. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIc 9-13 (1969).
1994]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of liberty against the danger of authoritarian government," and, unlike
French judges, they felt no need to be self-effacing and hide their law-creating
functions. Anglo-American history celebrates Coke's assertion of the
supremacy of the common law over the power of Parliament and the
Crown,"' the development of habeas corpus as a remedy for abuses of
executive power, 2 the trial of John Peter Zenger as a precedent for
freedom of speech, 3 and the American notion of a written constitution to
be enforced by lawyers and judges against the government as a guarantee of
liberty. 4 While judicial invention has sometimes given rise to criticism in
America, our judges never suffered the trauma of executions, the replacement
of one set of judicial institutions by another, or the requirement that judges
give an annual accounting of their actions before the legislature.
Perhaps the American opinion is as much a product of these features of
our history and culture as it is a means genuinely required to achieve goals
like persuasion and legitimacy. Unlike the parlementaires, American judges
would never have thought to hand down rulings in hard cases without
explanations. They lacked a conceptual foundation, such as the divine right
of kings, that would have permitted them to assert such a power. At the same
time, American judges never faced the need to hide their creative acts from
a hostile and suspicious populace. The English practice of reporting the
reasons for judicial decisions took root as early as the thirteenth century as a
means of instructing lawyers and law students. 5 Strengthened rather than
weakened by revolution, English and American judges remained free to act
as they always had, writing more elaborate reasoned opinions as society grew
more complex. In contrast to French judges, judges in the Anglo-American
tradition had no special incentive to avoid candor.
2. Divergent Perceptions of the Relation Between the Citizen and the
State
These features of French and Anglo-American legal history are important
not only for their own sake, but also because they contribute to differences in
the way French and American citizens perceive government and their relation
to it. Government may be viewed either as an entity standing apart from and
250. See MERRYMAN, supra note 105, at 16.
251. See CATHERmIE BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 305, 315 (1957).
252. See DANIEL J. MEADOR, HABEAS CoRPus AND MAONA CARTA 38-55 (1966).
253. See FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
254. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton).
255. See John H. Baker, Records, Reports and the Origins of Case-Law in England, in JUDICIAL
RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH OF CASE LAW 18-19 (John H. Baker ed., 1989). The earliest
reporting of English decisions was in unofficial reports. Over time, these reports evolved from student
manuals into "repositories of doctrine." See DAWSON, supra note 109, at 63. From these beginnings the
judges gradually developed a theory of precedent. See id. at 50-99. Officially authorized reports did not
begin in England until the nineteenth century. Id. at 88.
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above the people, or else as a cooperative enterprise among the citizenry in
which everyone is encouraged to participate. 6 The French, with an
authoritarian history that includes centuries of royal absolutism and two
nineteenth-century emperors, seem drawn to the former view.' By con-
trast, Americans have always believed ardently in popular sovereignty."s
This difference may have contributed to the gulf between French and
American judicial opinions.
In their actual operation, the governments of France and the United States
may be less different than their political cultures might suggest. After the
abolition of theparlements, few constraints on governmental power remained
in France. 9 Contemporary French government, however, is not markedly
more authoritarian than our own. Since the early years of the Third Republic,
which began in 1873, the French administrative law courts have developed
significant restraints on the exercise of governmental power in France.260
Conversely, modem American government little resembles the democratic
ideal of eighteenth-century Americans. For better or worse, as American
society has become more complex and government has been asked to take on
more tasks, it has become ever more centralized, bureaucratized, and remote.
Popular perceptions of government, however, remain significantly
different in France and in the United States. Viewing government in more
authoritarian terms, the French do not usually demand or expect real
explanations from officials in the way Americans commonly do, whether these
officials be legislators, administrators, or judges. So it is that, apart from a
few academics, 6 ' French citizens and lawyers generally accept the opaque
French opinion with few complaints.262 In fact, the French form is "consid-
ered all the more perfect for its concise and concentrated style, so that only
experienced jurists are able to understand and admire it. "263
Most Americans would probably find French form insulting. Although
few Americans actually read judicial opinions, they would regard it as
256. Cf. Mm4AN R. DAMAAKA, TnE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORiTY 16-46 (1986).
Damalka distinguishes between Continental and Anglo-American procedural systems by stressing, among
other things, the greater role of hierarchy in Continental systems, see id. at 19, in contrast to the Anglo-
American ideal of "a wide distribution of authority among roughly equal lay officials," id. at 25.
257. See LAuRENT COHEN-TANUGI, LE DRorr SANS L'ETAT 5-15 (1985) (contrasting French
dirigisme with American autordgulatton); Bell, supra note 96, at 1780, 1792-93; Louis Henkin,
Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (1989). The Revolution did not alter this
tendency, and may, in fact, have reinforced it. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOQUEVI.LE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 58-60 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969);
WOOD, supra note 249, at 344-89, esp. 388-89; Henkin, supra note 257, at 1032.
259. See VON MEHEN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 342-43.
260. See BROWN & GARNER, supra note 110, at 3.
261. See, e.g., Touffait & Tunc, supra note 113; cf. Jean Deprez, A Propos du Rapport Annuel de
la Cour de Cassation, 77 REVuE TRRdMRIELLE DU DRorr Clvii 503, 532 & n.58 (1978) (arguing that
inability to discuss substantive foundations for decisions prevents judges themselves from fully participating
in government policymaldng).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 172 to 173.
263. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 220, at 142.
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arrogant and undemocratic for a judge to conceal his reasons behind a formal
fagade. In order to respect these American sensibilities, opinions must be
addressed not just to a professional elite, but to a larger audience of interested
citizens. Whether or not most opinions actually are reasoned or persuasive is
considered less important than the principle that they should be. Americans
prefer a legal system that maintains the image of judges who offer reasons to
persuade citizens of the rectitude of judicial decisions over one in which those
decisions are presented to the public as edicts from on high.
3. Individualism and Competition
Individuals in America often pursue their own notions of success and self-
fulfillment in isolation from broader concerns of society as a whole. 264
Brought up in an economy that celebrates the free market and the competitive
struggle, ambitious Americans learn early in life that self-promotion is
virtually indispensable to success. This American penchant for individualism
and competition may have some bearing on the form of American opin-
ions. 26" Americans tend to see success as the proof of merit, and feel that
judges on high courts should be selected, by and large, from among lawyers
with successful careers behind them. These men and women could not have
attained their current status without a taste for competition, and one should not
expect them to give up competing for power, status, and influence in the
judicial stage of their careers. Richard Posner condemns the federal judiciary
for writing "self-indulgent displays performed with little concern for the
interests and needs of the audience for the opinions. ' 266 One explanation for
this tendency is that many judges, successful lawyers that they are, enjoy
contests in which they can establish and promote their private reputations
through aggressiveness and flair.
By contrast, France is a more hierarchial, structured society. For judges
in France, succeeding on examinations is more important than competing in
the marketplace as a path to success. Except for a few specialized courts,
French judges enter the profession right out of law school. They attend a
school for judges, become civil servants, and work their way up through the
judicial ranks. 67 Trained as bureaucrats rather than as individuals competing
264. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAM ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 27-28, 32-33, 84, 142 passim
(1985) (discussing individualism in American life).
265. Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 114-25 (1987) (impor-
tance Americans attach to individualism helps explain differences between American and European law
on abortion and divorce).
266. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 230; see also POSNER, REPUTATION, supra note
13, at 147-48 ("The temptation is to make a judicial opinion an exercise in self-advertisement and self-
aggrandisement, and is enhanced by the eminence that has accrued to judges (such as Cardozo) who write
highly individualistic opinions.').
267. See Bell, supra note 96, at 1758-61 (noting somewhat different career path of administrative
judges).
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for clients or tenure, they are perceived as professionals with secure prestige
and access to special knowledge.268 Most of them are not especially inter-
ested in self-promotion. French judges are not ciphers who merely apply
existing law to the facts; as noted earlier, French judges do engage in
lawmaking and policy formulation,269 if somewhat less often than do
American judges. The difference is that French judges do so anonymously.2 7
Whatever its historical origins, French judicial form, with its narrow focus
upon the case at hand, its deductive form, and its refusal to acknowledge a
role for policy analysis, perfectly suits French judges' predilections for
bureaucracy. 271
The American tendency to write reasoned opinions is not entirely a
product of judicial ego, nor does it wholly lack advantages. Giving American
judges an especially prominent role in the debate over difficult issues and
substantial leeway to introduce substantive and policy concerns into their
opinions, for example, engenders a body of commentary that would never
have existed were U.S. opinions more spartan.
It would be too much to claim that the cultural factors elaborated in the
preceding paragraphs wholly explain the American opinion.272 In emphasiz-
ing the divergent historical backgrounds of French and American opinions, I
do not mean to endorse a crude cultural determinism in which everything is
explained by historical events and the imprint they leave on the attitudes of
participants in the legal system. My point is merely that the instrumental view
of American opinions should not be embraced simply because we are aware
of no other. Furthermore, the cultural account does not necessarily displace
the instrumental view; they are not mutually exclusive explanations. Instead,
the two may complement each other. A full understanding of the origins of
American opinion form, as well as of many of our current practices, may lie
partly in the aspects of our history and culture discussed in the preceding
268. Id. at 1772-73.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 104 to 111 and 196 to 206.
270. Perhaps French judges' anonymity and bureaucratic orientation contribute to their less active
role as lawmakers. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 43, at 1145-50. It remains true that French
judges exercise a creative role that may be more pronounced than that of English judges, who nevertheless
employ the reasoned opinion. See Tunc, Methodology, supra note 105. So it seems that judicial training
and outlook bear not only on the scope of judicial invention but also, and quite independently, on the form
of opinions.
271. See HENRY EHRMANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 108, 122 (1976).
272. Some authors have suggested additional differences between the French and American legal
cultures. For example, the two cultures may have different tastes in argumentative strategies. One may
infer from their willingness to overlook its faults that many French lawyers prefer deductive reasoning to
other forms of argument. See SCHROEDER, supra note 47, at 54 (suggesting that lawyers opposed
abandoning the syllogistic opinion because they feared "a loose and diffuse drafting of the judgment, the
writer letting his pen run, and the judgment stretching out and scattering itself in proportion to its author's
prolixity"). Americans, on the other hand, have a predilection for displays of rhetoric. See POSNER,
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 24, at 149 (stressing importance in our legal culture of
"persuasion by rhetoric rather than by the coolest forms of reasoned exposition").
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paragraphs. Many opinions doubtless serve with some success the ends of
guidance, persuasion, constraint, and legitimacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
fflou see, on this earth, there is one thing which is terrible, and that is that everyone has
their own good reasons.'
Working within a legal and cultural tradition, it is often hard to conceive
how anyone could do without the well-entrenched institutions we see around
us. The root of this problem is the human tendency to suppose that the
features of the social world as it is are "natural and inevitable," and that they
"must be" the way they are.'7 Stepping outside our system to compare
French and American opinions is a useful exercise, because it helps us to see
aspects of judicial form that we might otherwise have overlooked. If nothing
else, the comparison demonstrates that the candid and reasoned opinion, which
Americans take for granted, is not the universal or the inevitable choice.
Judicial form is not a fixed part of the landscape, but a legal institution whose
merits can be debated like those of any other. If the reasoned opinion seems
best to us, that judgment may rest as much on an assessment of its familiarity
as on its intrinsic merits. The evident success of the French legal system in
providing for the needs of a complex modem society without candid, reasoned
opinions indicates that the reasoned opinion may not be so essential to the
success of our legal system as we had presumed. The supposedly critical
functions it serves - guidance, persuasion, constraint, and legitimacy - may
be achieved well enough in other ways. The comparison casts doubt on
whether the American opinion is in fact best understood solely as an effort to
achieve those goals. Various features of our history and legal culture may
explain our practice better than the instrumental interpretation alone.
The evidence presented here that the French legal system manages to do
without genuinely reasoned opinions sheds light on the perennial debate
among American theorists over the importance of "process values." Every
judge who writes opinions, and every observer who assesses judicial
performance, employs a complex set of criteria that values craft and rhetoric
that produce well-reasoned opinions as well as the inherent wisdom of the
court's resolution of the merits. In addition to these substantive and process
values, however, these criteria must include a judgment as to the relative
importance of legal reasoning as opposed to substantive outcomes. Even if few
Americans would deny that legal reasoning is worthwhile or that judges
273. JEAN RENOIR, RULES OF THE GAME 53 (John McGrath & Maureen Teitelbaum trans., 1970)
(1939).
274. Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in Tim POLrrics OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIrE CRTIQuE 281, 288 (David Kairys ed., 1982) [hereinafter PROGRESSPVE CRmQuE].
[Vol. 19: 81
French and American Judicial Opinions
should take pains to set forth their reasoning in opinions, there is room for
disagreement over how much weight legal reasoning should receive relative
to the substantive merit of the outcome.
By prompting second thoughts regarding the importance of preparing
reasoned opinions, I hope to contribute to the ongoing debate between
partisans of process values, on the one hand, and skeptics associated with such
movements as pragmatism, legal realism, Critical Legal Studies, and law and
economics on the other. These rival camps disagree over the relative value of
legal reasoning and substantive outcomes in judicial decisionmaking.
Adherence to the traditional norms of legal reasoning - deciding cases
according to precedent, identifying and implementing the statutory purpose,
and insisting upon principled decisionmaking - may sometimes require a
court to sacrifice a worthwhile substantive or institutional goal, such as
making the law more just or efficient, or shielding the court from political
attacks.27 When conflicts arise between process and results, which should
prevail?
Early in this century legal realists questioned the objectivity and the
value of legal reasoning,276 and their attack has been endorsed in recent
years by members of the Critical Legal Studies movement.2' Law-and-
economics scholars sometimes claim that the reasoning in opinions obscures
the real, economic rationale for outcomes.27 Pragmatists like Judge Richard
Posner argue that the reasoning in judicial opinions is often unimpressive,279
and that more attention should be paid to policy analysis aimed at achieving
sensible results.28 While these critics hold diverse views about the substan-
tive agenda courts should pursue, they share a skeptical attitude toward
process values in general - and toward the traditional judicial opinion in
particular.
275. An American analogue to the Cour de Cassation's determination to deny its creative role by
writing syllogistic opinions is the U.S. Supreme Court's use of a variety of unprincipled devices to avoid
politically sensitive or otherwise awkward decisions on the merits. Compare ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962) (describing and defending practice) with Gerald Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the 'Passive irtues,' 64 COLUM. L. RaV. 1 (1964) (criticizing Bickel's thesis)..
276. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.,
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929);
see also Moses Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49 CAL. L. REV. 831, 839
(1961) (voicing skepticism as to whether reasons given in opinions are real reasons for decisions).
277. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, Book Review, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 231-48 (1983); David
Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in PROGRESSVE CRTFQUE, supra note 274, at 11-17; Mark Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom
and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomonology, 36 J. LEG. EDUC. 518 (1986); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV.
781 (1983).
278. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 51 (1977).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 224 to 230.
280. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 24, at 130-48.
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By contrast, some champions of the candid and reasoned opinion do not
merely claim that preparing such opinions is a worthwhile endeavor. They
often go further, insisting that reasoned explication is a fundamental aim of
the legal order that cannot be compromised without risking disaster. Lon
Fuller, for example, thought that adjudication simply could not take place in
the absence of reasoned argument.281 James Boyd White thinks that "it is
essential to any legal system worthy of respect that it invite the use of mind
and judgment in its readers. ,,2" David Shapiro feels that judicial candor may
be compromised only in the extreme case where honesty would conflict with
an important moral obligation."n Ronald Dworkin believes that coherence,
or "integrity" in his terminology, is a "distinct political virtue" entitled to the
same weight as justice and fairness.2" Charles Fried fears that "respect for
the rule of law has been somewhat abraded by a generation or more of
skepticism about the discipline and definiteness of law."285 The implication
of all of these views is that it may be necessary to sacrifice worthy substantive
or institutional goals in order to serve the overriding value of reasoned
decisionmaking.
The existence of a less reasoned French alternative casts a shadow on
such ambitious claims for reasoned opinions, for it suggests that outcomes
rather than process may be what count most in evaluating the merits of a legal
system. Granting that there is some independent value in providing the real
reasons for results reached, the French courts' not writing reasoned opinions
suggests nevertheless that it is wrong to treat legal reasoning as a consider-
ation that must be respected no matter what the cost in lost opportunities to
realize worthwhile substantive goals. The aridity of the French opinion seems
to reflect less attention on the part of French than American judges to such
features of legal reasoning as identifying relevant precedents, implementing
statutory purpose, and avoiding arbitrary distinctions. The French experience
thus suggests that ruin is not the inevitable consequence of judges' failure to
accord overriding weight to the values served by reasoned opinions. 286
Americans like White, Fuller, Dworkin, Fried, and Shapiro, who think that
the candid and reasoned opinion has substantial independent value apart from
the outcome it achieves, may be mistaken. Perhaps reason in opinion writing
ought to count only as one of many values, to be considered along with the
281. See Fuller, supra note 29, at 365-71.
282. WnTm, supra note 9, at 101; see also id. at 91-92, 158.
283. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 738, 749-50.
284. See Dwomlnw, supra note 31, at 166; see also Schauer, supra note 36, at 855 (describing
Dworkin's project).
285. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the 'Black Ink' of the Framers' Intention, 100 HAV. L. REV.
751, 751 (1987).
286. On the other hand, if this assumption is wrong, and French judges actually do pay as much
attention as American judges to the values of legal reasoning, even though they do not write reasoned
opinions, then it would seem hard to justify the time and effort that goes into preparing American
opinions. In this event, perhaps judges would do better to spend their time catching up with the backlog
of cases than writing painstaking analyses of precedent and principle.
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whole array of substantive and institutional concerns that may be furthered by
writing an unreasoned opinion.

